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Abstract 
The role of morality in the decision-making and behaviour of individuals has a 
long research history across a wide range of disciplines, and has led to often-
competing descriptions and definitions of morality itself. While religious belief has 
been at the core of some previous work, hedonic models of morality have also been 
used to explain behaviour and decisions. However, such models leave many common 
behavioural patterns unexplained, with the theories unable to readily reconcile the 
conflict between expected outcome and observed reality. One proposal that addresses 
these failures is moral licensing and cleansing theory, also known as moral self-
licensing. 
The theory of moral self-licensing, that individuals utilise an almost 
homeostatic mechanism to balance their internal moral state with either immoral or 
prosocial acts, has a strong research record in consumer behaviour fields. While a 
number of leading studies have more recently explored the theory from a 
psychological perspective, the body of literature covering this theory in the field of 
psychology remains limited. Over two experiments, this thesis sought to further 
explore how the theory may explain decisions in an array of situations more varied 
than previously utilised, and how it may interact with other factors in decision-
making. 
Across various environmental/economic, academic and interpersonal 
hypothetical situations, Experiment 1 failed to find a significant effect of the utilised 
moral prime, nor a hypothesised interaction with the gratitude manipulation. 
Building on these results, and the theoretical and methodological implications, 
Experiment 2 replaced the gratitude interaction in favour of an internal feedback 
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mechanism; with a proposed interaction effect between this and the moral prime. 
Significant statistical effects were found for both the refined moral prime and the 
internal feedback mechanism, though in both cases such effects were mixed. In the 
moral prime, one condition reached significance while the other did not. Similarly, 
one condition of internal feedback resulted in a statistically significant effect while 
the other failed to reach significance. 
This thesis discusses a number of possible interpretations and implications of 
the mixed results, including the role of accessibility of scenarios and situations, the 
complexity of interpersonal relationship decisions and the scope of applicability of 
the theory in emotive rather than rational scenarios. This thesis also suggests a 
number of directions for future work on the theory, including the implications of 
different effects between sins of commissions against sins of omission in the 
examined decisions, and further work exploring the applicability of theory in more 
varied situations, amongst others. This thesis concludes by endorsing the theory as an 
explanation for various effects on individual decision-making and behaviour, though 
questioning the previously proclaimed pervasiveness of its applicability. 
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Moral Licensing and Cleansing Theory: A Study in Decision-Making, Morality 
and Interaction 
Human decision-making is a widely explored topic within social psychology. It 
is also an increasingly diverse topic, with studies examining the ever-increasing 
dimensions that are involved in human decision-making. In cases where people are 
assumed to act as rational individuals, seeking out the option that balances risk and 
reward, normative models have long reigned supreme. 
Normative models make use of mathematical equations and principles to 
predict choices and behaviors. As Moser (1990) states, the first major normative 
model was Expected Utility Theory (EUT), which stated that people would always 
choose the option with the maximum expected outcome. However Schoemaker 
(1982), Starmer (2000) and Harrison and Rutstrom (2009), amongst others, have 
pointed to patterns of behavior that consistently violate EUT. Such observed 
violations saw the development of new cognitive theories, such as Prospect Theory 
(PT), the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). PT argues for a discounting model, 
where both prospective gains and losses are discounted, but losses are discounted 
more heavily (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  
However, normative models such as EUT approach decision-making from an 
outcomes-centric point of view, assuming the individual to be a rational actor. 
Similarly, “consequentialist” theories such as PT assume that the decision-maker 
only takes into account consequences that may affect themselves, while ignoring 
others. Studies have demonstrated this is often not the case. For example, an 
individual whose decision-making is guided, at least in part, by their morality would 
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doubtlessly consider the effects of their decision on others. Factual or computational 
factors alone cannot account for such decisions. Under such a decision-making 
situation, what is or could be true does not dictate what ought to be true. 
The question of morality, and the individual as a moral decision-maker, is one 
counter balance to the rational actor view. Exactly how one defines morality and 
acting morally has been the source of extensive debate and research, both within the 
psychology discipline (Sachdeva, Iliev & Medin, 2009), and other areas, such as 
religion, philosophy and sociology. In fact, Monin and Merritt (2012) argue that, 
overall, social psychology is a study of morality and moral hypocrisy. However, 
within the confines of this thesis, a more specific area of morality, and its role in 
decision-making, must be focused on. 
One such theoretical approach to morality and decision-making, is the theory 
of moral self-licensing and cleansing, also known as moral self-licensing. Over the 
following sections of this chapter, the links between morality and decision-making 
will be explored in greater detail, including how previous models of decision-making 
may be related to morality, the theory of moral licensing and cleansing, and how it 
explains influences on human behaviour. Further, this chapter will explore how other 
possible influences on decision-making, such as emotions, may influence moral 
theories of decision-making. The chapter will conclude with a description of the first 
experiment.   
Early Normative Theory 
EUT, developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern, was one of the earliest, 
widely accepted normative theories. As Plous (1993) and Moser (1990) outline, it 
argues for a rational agent, acting in a manner to maximize expected gains. 
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Mathematically, the expected utility is the sum of the possible outcomes multiplied 
by the probability of success. As outlined by Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997) 
and Kahneman and Tversky (1979), each possible choice an individual may make is 
termed a prospect. These prospects are defined as “contracts”, which result in the 
outcome xi, with a probability of pi. Assets that an individual possesses are then 
further taken into account; to form a final expected utility (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). 
As outlined by Plous (1993), the rational choice at the heart of EUT was made 
up of 5 axioms: Invariance, Dominance, Cancellation, Transivity and Continuity. 
Invariance states that the order or manner in which alternative prospects are 
presented to the decision-maker will not influence their preference. Dominance 
states that if one prospect, A, is superior to another prospect, B, in one way, but 
equal in all others, then prospect A will be preferred by the decision-maker at all 
times. Cancellation affirms that if two prospects share any commonality, that 
commonality will be irrelevant to the decision. Transivity declares that if A is 
chosen as superior to B, and B chosen as superior to C, then A will be chosen over C. 
Finally, Continuity posits that a gamble between two opposing prospects, best and 
worst, with satisfactory odds is preferable to a certain intermediate outcome. 
Later Descriptive Models and Links to Morality: Regulatory Focus 
Higgins (1997; 1998) developed Regulatory Focus (RF) as an alternative 
choice theory, which used a social, as opposed to cognitive, approach. On a basic 
level, RF distinguishes between two states of motivation: promotion and prevention 
focus. Whilst different, both work to approach pleasure and avoid pain (Forster, 
Higgins & Idson, 1998). Promotion is the attainment of growth, advancement and 
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accomplishment, whilst prevention is concerned with safety, responsibility and 
security (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). RF links gain with pleasure and loss with pain, 
and by doing so, Higgins (1997; 1998) argues that the presence of gain v loss leads 
to different decision-making tactics, all of which hold some basis in the decisions 
hedonic principle, as outlined by Camacho, Higgins and Luger (2003). 
Logically in RF, the presence or absence of gains is the required stimulus for 
promotion focus while the presence or absence of loss is required for prevention 
focus (Renshaw, 2008). In promotion focus the absence of a gain is viewed as a non-
gain, while in prevention focus the absence of a loss is viewed as a non-loss. 
However, a non-gain is not experienced in similar fashion to a loss, while a non-loss 
is not experienced as a gain, despite similar final states in both cases. Rather, gains 
are experienced more intensely than non-losses, and conversely, a loss is experienced 
more intensely than a non-gain (Idson, Liberman & Higgins, 2000). Idson et al. 
(2000) also demonstrated that prevention focus individuals experience criticism and 
negative feedback more intensely and strongly than individuals in promotion focus. 
Therefore, it is possible to argue that an individual’s regulatory focus may affect the 
experience of hedonic states, despite the same final state. 
RF is also one of the later descriptive models of decision-making, which most 
closely aligns with a view to the moral aspect of decision-making. At the core of 
both RF and moral judgments is a consideration or concern for the regulation of 
behaviour of self, and others in the case of morality. In RF, this concern for 
regulation may lead individuals to either a promotion focus, with a subsequent 
increase in risk-taking, or a prevention focus, which leads to greater risk aversion 
(Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Similarly, those with a strict moral code may be more 
prone to risk aversion compared to individuals with a more lax moral sense. Though 
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an individual’s morality/moral code is a more personal, rather than the comparatively 
set parameters of promotion or prevention focus in RF, both examine the regulation 
of self in determining the reason for behaviour and decisions. 
Furthermore, studies by Gino and Margolis (2011) extended RF into ethical 
behaviour research. Across four experiments, they found that promotion focus 
primes lead to increased unethical behaviour compared to prevention focus primes, 
and that how ethical standards were framed in material influenced individual ethical 
behaviour differently depending on RF prime. Such findings are especially relevant 
to this thesis given prior literature on RF tackled decision-making in a sterile 
vacuum, instead of concerning moral and ethical questions or behaviours. 
A Question of Morality 
Decision-making cannot be viewed in a vacuum free from the constraints of 
individual beliefs, morals and emotions. As Dunning (2007) argued, individuals 
often base their feelings of self-worth on a perception of their own morality. As such, 
decisions must be subsequently made in accordance with this morality in order to 
maintain an appropriate level of self-worth. To a degree, this is simply a retake on 
the hedonic model, where one seeks to avoid pain and gain pleasure (or low self-
worth v. high self-worth in the Dunning model). Additionally, it must be 
acknowledged that though moral judgments are an individual process, each person 
applies these to others, not just themselves. Hence, self-interest cannot be the only 
basis for such complex, and all-encompassing aspects of individual belief and 
thought. 
An extension of Dunning’s (2007) argument may be to accept the basic 
premise as one of the aspects of individual belief and morality, but also 
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acknowledging additional factors. In his 1988 paper on moral culture within modern 
secular societies, and the return of the religion in politics and culture, Kavolis noted 
the creation of symbolic authority, which results from consideration of a social 
reality and the weak spots of said social reality; what it misses. Such symbolic 
authorities are meant to represent the “good order” of human experiences, and are 
intended to be universal and non-negotiable. Similarly, psychological research in a 
broad range of areas has highlighted moral views and obligations widely seen as 
non-negotiable and in essence, sacred.  
Tetlock (2002) for example, proposed the social functionalist argument which 
views individuals’ decision-making and judgments as a form of principled 
theologians, seeking to protect sacred values. A further example stemming from 
parenting research is the moral obligation of parents to place their children’s 
interests, needs and requirements before their own (McCarthy, Edwards & Gillies, 
2000). Therefore while Dunning (2007) described the important of self-interest, it is 
also important to acknowledge that some aspects of morality are often widely viewed 
as non-negotiable, playing an important role in the majority of individual’s moral 
judgments, decisions and views. 
Morality is also a broad term that has come to encompass numerous facets and 
a large number of ideas, theories, as well as strains of study and research. Studies 
have sought to link morality to an individual’s political beliefs and persuasions, to 
broader issues of a society’s charity, crime and punishment, as well as numerous 
other questions. Additionally, psychologists have attempted to chart and explain 
developments and changes in moral thinking as we age, such as Kohlberg’s six 
stages of moral development (Kohlberg & Lickona, 1976). This thesis examines 
morality as an individual trait, and the theories and belief systems that influence it, 
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with an ultimate purpose of establishing a revised working definition of morality that 
this thesis may use. 
Basis in Religion 
No examination of individual morality can avoid discussing morality as a 
religious concept. As Preston, Ritter and Hernandez (2010) state, religion and 
religious thought has long been viewed as the source for human morality. One has 
merely to take an interest in the ongoing dispute between the current wave of more 
militant atheism and the religious establishment to hear the argument that, in the 
Western world, Judeo-Christian values constitute the foundation to our moral code. 
The Ten Commandments, as written in Exodus 20 (King James Version) contain 
what is today still one of, if not the, most widely cited moral reference points.  
This thesis acknowledges that while religious belief may inform many people’s 
personal morality codes, morality cannot be accepted as so unipolar. Nonetheless, it 
remains an important aspect to take into consideration. 
Before further exploring aspects of morality which may impact upon this 
thesis, it is first important to construct at least a working model and definition of 
morality. While numerous authors, researchers and commentators have pointed to 
religion as a primary model, or at least primary foundation for morality (Stace, 
1962), and others have argued for a combined secular-religious foundation (Kavolis, 
1988), for the purposes of this thesis religion is at the same time too narrow and 
broad. Firstly, religion itself is a vast topic, covering hundreds of different faiths, and 
an even greater number of differing interpretations of these faiths. However, a 
religious-only foundation also ignores those of no faith, as well as individual who 
actively reject religious faith, even if using a hybridised model of symbolic authority, 
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such as described by Kavolis (1988). Finally, a religious only model would continue 
to, at least partially, ignore the social pressures which can often impact upon, as well 
as conflict with, personally held moralities (Monin & Miller, 2001). 
Models of Morality 
Eisenberg and Shell (1986) commented that morality, in terms of behavior, 
could be viewed as the balance between a wish to undertake good behaviour and lead 
to positive outcomes, but simultaneously avoid the costs often associated with good 
acts. Similarly Erkut, Jaquette and Staub (1981) argued that morality is often 
influenced by one’s situation, and how that situation may influence the cost of 
certain moralities or moral decisions (Staub, 1978). However both arguments broadly 
follow a hedonic model, failing to account for values or beliefs held to a higher 
standard than simply seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. 
As mentioned above, Tetlock (2002) proposed the social functionalist model of 
the principled theologian, as well as the pragmatic politician and the prudent 
prosecutor. Under the social functionalist principled theologian label, morality, 
though personal and individual, is also something immune to outside forces and 
influences. Indeed, it can be something seen as needing to be protected from such 
conflicts. While functionalist arguments and theories, which view choice and 
decision-making through the prism of individual’s as either intuitive scientists or 
intuitive economists (Kelley, 1971; Edwards, 1962), where the sought outcome is 
either increased knowledge, understanding and leverage, or increased subjective 
utility and gain, respectively. However, this functionalist dichotomy fails to account 
for the individual who clings to morals and principles despite any and all conflict 
with either the intuitive scientist or intuitive economist state. 
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It is also important to note the difference between deontological and utilitarian 
principles in morality, and how this impacts upon the above working definition, and 
subsequent interpretation of findings. When considering moral judgments, dual-
process theories highlight the deontological principle, that the morality of an action 
or behaviour can be judged by the behaviour or action itself, and the utilitarian 
principle, that the morality of an action or behaviour can be judged by the outcome it 
brings about (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen, 2001; Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013). This difference is vital to our understanding of morality, and this 
thesis’ use of the term, as it divides what may be seen as a consequentialist view of 
the subject, the ends justify the means, from a non-consequentialist view, that the 
means themselves must be justifiable. While most individuals take one view more 
often over the other, previous research found both correlated positively with moral 
identity (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). Hence, this distinction should be kept in 
mind when interpreting this thesis’ experimental results. 
Taking into account the need for a working definition that accounts for such 
social functionalist models, for the purposes of this thesis, morality refers to an 
individual’s strongly held beliefs regarding right and wrong. This definition must 
also distinguish between moral principles, judgments and beliefs, and behaviours, 
decision and beliefs that stem from social norms and widely accepted conventions. 
While it is important to acknowledge that social norms and morals do often overlap, 
in this thesis, morality is used in reference to personal beliefs and values, regardless 
of how these ally with conventions in society. 
Morality v Altruism 
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While moral action and altruism are often taken to mean one and the same, it is 
important to discuss the similarities and differences between the two. While moral 
action may be defined as acting in line with one’s own moral standards, altruism 
refers to selfless action, where an individual does not benefit and the motivator is 
purely to benefit others. This is in contrast to the long held psychological belief that 
all actions, even those designed to result in a benefit for another, were rooted in 
egoistic motivations (Batson & Shaw, 1991). 
Some researchers still use the terms altruism and moral action/behavior almost 
interchangeably. Sachdeva et al. (2009) notably introduce their paper using the term 
altruism but subsequently refer to moral behavior. This disguises small differences in 
meaning.  When discussing behavior in moral terms, though cost is at times 
mentioned (Eisenberg & Shell, 1986; Erkut et al., 1981), it is not inherent in the 
definition, merely a common element. Conversely, Robert Trivers (1971) argues for 
a definition of altruism relying on the notion of detriment to the individual acting in 
such a manner. While it is true that not all definitions of altruism require this, for 
example that of Auguste Comte (as cited in Batson & Shaw, 1991), the individual 
who coined the term, many modern definitions, which separate altruism from 
morality, do so. 
Additionally altruism is by definition concerned with helping another; that is 
its ultimate goal (Batson & Shaw, 1991). However, for an individual to behave 
morally, no direct impact upon another individual is required. A moral act may be 
one purely concerned with the self. A person who spots a $5 note on a busy city 
street may logically conclude than the individual who lost it is unlikely to find it, and 
thus picking up the note is not depriving that individual of a reasonable chance at 
recovering their money. However, a person’s morality may still prevent them from 
	 	 MORAL	LICENSING	AND	CLEANSING	 11	
picking up this money. No altruistic motivation is necessarily present here, merely a 
moral one. As such, while altruism and moral behavior may at times mirror one 
another, and in fact be closely related, this does not mean they are the same thing. As 
this thesis is examining moral decision-making, this is important to bear in mind. 
Moral Behaviour and Morals in Decision-Making 
With a working definition of morality, this thesis will now address the role of 
morality in decision-making. Important issues to address in greater detail include 
motivators for moral behaviour, previous findings and theories describing alignment 
of actions with morals, theories regarding moral reasoning in behaviour, and the 
overlap and confusion of prosocial behaviour as faux morality. This section will end 
with an examination of the focal theory, moral self-licensing. 
Motivators of Moral Behaviour 
There are numerous motives for individuals to partake in a moral form of 
behaviour, including the implicit role of personal morality as a guiding force in one’s 
views and decisions. In addition, under hedonic models certain moral judgments may 
serve to encourage behaviours that promise reward. These more straightforward 
motivations have been addressed and described above. 
The broader role of emotions in decision-making will be addressed in greater 
detail later in this chapter, for now this thesis notes that emotions also play a role in 
motivating moral behaviour and decision-making. Sympathy and empathy have most 
often been cited as reasons for moral behavior. Batson (1991) argued for the primacy 
of both emotions as a way to understand why individual act in a moral manner. 
Miller and Eisenberg (1988) demonstrated that both emotions could reduce behavior 
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seen as morally unacceptable, such as antisocial behavior. Similarly, the moral 
behavior and decisions of forgiveness, letting bygones be bygones, have been 
consistently linked to empathy and sympathy, with both emotions having been found 
to increase the likelihood of such action (McCullough, Worthington & Rachal, 
1997). 
It is also important to highlight that theories regarding emotion as a motivator 
for moral behaviour at times equate prosocial and antisocial actions with moral and 
immoral ones respectively. Such an equation can fail to delineate between morality 
and accepted social norms and conventions, as discussed above. Miller and 
Eisenberg (1988) utilised antisocial behaviour as a form of morally unacceptable 
behaviour. However, there are clear differences, as well as some overlaps. While 
certain behaviours and actions, for example murder, may be both antisocial and 
immoral, others such as spitting can hardly be classified as such. This does not 
negate the theory or argument for emotions as primary motivators, but is merely a 
further example of confusion and lack of careful differentiation generally applied to 
morality and social norms. 
Social Stigma  
While researchers have argued that the emotions of sympathy and empathy 
encourage moral behaviour due to increasing the positive and moral outlook of an 
individual, others have argued that social stigmatisation has similar results, due to a 
will to avoid such consequences. Hence, the two may be seen as related sides of a 
hedonic model argument. 
Recent studies have looked into the interplay between moral codes, and 
(overwhelmingly) negative social stigmatisation. One prominent social stigma 
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utilised has been the label of racist. Crocker, Major and Steele (1998) have argued 
that, in modern society, being labeled racist is almost akin to the threat that those 
stigmatised minorities have in the past experienced, and experience today. While the 
outward expression of racist beliefs and opinions has definitively decreased in recent 
times (McConahay, Hardee & Batts, 1981), debate continues as to whether the level 
that society holds racists opinions has also dropped. In a series of studies, Monin and 
Miller (2001) found that individuals were increasingly likely to demonstrate or 
express opinions of a prejudiced or racist nature, if recent actions of statements had 
shown them to be nonracist or non-prejudiced. Their experiments also made use of 
sexism and a number of other prejudices along with racism. 
This line of argument again raises the issue of separating actual morality from 
social norms. While racism would clearly violate the moral codes and beliefs of 
some individuals, it is arguable that those willing to engage in racism, and make 
racist statements, due to previously establishing non-racist credentials may merely 
avoid racism due to it violating social norms and accepted conventions. Such 
individuals may also attempt to rationalise their own racist beliefs as matters of fact, 
not prejudice. While violation of such norms does lead to stigmatisation, this does 
not mean the stigmatisation has led to moral behaviour, rather it has led to behaviour 
in line with social convention. 
Moral Cleansing Behaviour 
While moral hypocrisy may describe the state of conflict between a claimed or 
held moral position and reasoning compared to actual actions or motives, it does not 
address how people seek to rectify this contradiction. One such method is moral 
cleansing. In their pioneering experiment utilising the electric shock of confederates, 
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Carlsmith and Gross (1969) observed what would come to be viewed as one of the 
earliest experimental examples of moral cleansing. When participants were required 
to administer electric shocks to a confederate, causing large amounts of perceived 
pain, these same participants were subsequently far more compliant to the 
researcher’s demands and wishes than those participants who had either merely 
observed the electro-shock or who had administered negative verbal feedback to the 
confederates. As Sachdeva et al. (2009) explain, it has been reasoned that those 
participants who had actively engaged in the electro-shock, and thus violated their 
morals, needing to bolster their self-image and self-worth, caused this difference in 
behavior. Carlsmith and Gross (1969) argued for this reasoning, as opposed to an 
explanation based on restitution with the victim. 
In more recent research, moral cleansing has often been demonstrated to be 
more extreme than the above examples. In research by Zhong and Liljenquist in 
2006, participants were observed physically washing and cleansing with soaps and 
anti-septic after been required to duplicate an unethical story by hand. Similarly, 
Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green and Lerner (2000) set up a situation where a group of 
participants engaged in a discussion on the payment of poor and underclass 
individuals for their organs. Subsequently, these participants indicated an increased 
willingness to become organ donors, or undertake volunteer work. Sachdeva et al. 
(2009) state that such studies demonstrate individuals attempting to literally cleanse 
their beings in response to moral violation. 
Moral Licensing and Cleansing Theory (Moral Self-Licensing) 
It is apparent from the above discussion that influences upon individual 
behaviour, and specifically moral behaviour, often appear contradictory, or at least 
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fail to address one or more circumstances of decision-making. While appeals to the 
influence of emotions, such as empathy or sympathy, may account for differences in 
moral behaviour between individuals, they less readily explain differences in 
individual moral behaviour between similar circumstances. In similar situations, why 
does empathy or sympathy lead to moral behaviour on one occasion but not another? 
Similarly, moral behaviour to avoid stigmatisation, or bolster one’s own image, the 
seeking of pleasure and avoidance of pain, may explain individual behaviour to seek 
such ends. However, such hedonic models fail to explain behaviours that risk such 
outcomes in order to preserve a moral view. They are unable to explain findings such 
as Sachdeva et al. (2009) where individuals at times behave in a manner consistent 
with personal morality despite its costs, and at other times readily break with this 
morality. 
Further, what of moral hypocrisy? While traditionally moral hypocrisy has 
been viewed as synonymous with inconsistency, the notion of not practicing what 
one preaches (Naso, 2006), Monin and Merritt (2012) argued for a more discerning 
definition. They argued that moral hypocrisy could occur in the absence of 
inconsistency in cases where an individual makes a moral claim in bad faith, where 
the true motivation is self-serving. 
Additionally, situations where moral concerns are minimized or “toned down” 
as they pose some form of threat. Monin and Merritt (2012) ultimately arrived at the 
conclusion that the true definition of moral hypocrisy must encompass the act of 
claiming moral reasoning or a moral position, where in fact the true motive or reason 
is devoid of morality. With this expanded view of moral hypocrisy, are hedonic 
models able to encompass and consider such implications when explaining 
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behaviours and decisions, or does it simply provide further limitations of such 
theories? 
Such limitations and failures highlight the need for a theory to explain an 
apparent homeostatic behavioural sequence where moral behaviour, and 
contradictory immoral behaviours, balances out one another. The theory of moral 
self-licensing attempts to provide this. 
Though moral self-licensing theory has a relatively limited research 
background in psychology (see Blanken, van de Ven & Zeelenberg, 2015; Blanken, 
van de Ven, Zeelenberg & Meijers, 2014), there is a significant body of experiment 
research in the field of consumer behaviour, and related economic areas of study 
(Khan & Dhar 2006; Strahilevitz & Myers, 1998).  Nisan (1991) argued that 
individuals strive to preserve a “baseline” or morality: bad actions must be balanced 
with good actions (Monin & Merritt, 2012). Those who feel that they are highly 
moral individuals are more likely to subsequently act in an immoral manner, and 
those who feel in a state of little morality are more likely to subsequently act in a 
moral manner to restore the baseline (Sachdeva et al., 2009). 
Addressing moral self-licensing in their paper on moral hypocrisy and 
inconsistency, Monin and Merritt (2012) argued that inconsistency may not 
necessarily result in moral hypocrisy if some form of balance is perceived in the 
positive and negative deeds: if the good and bad actions balance themselves out. 
They give the example of an individual undertaking a rigorous workout in the 
morning, while partaking in an unhealthy treat, such as chocolate cake, later in the 
day. While one action may be conceived as good (exercise) and the other bad (the 
unhealthy treat), no feeling of hypocrisy is needed as they serve to balance each 
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other out, even though there is clear inconsistency. They also use the analogy of a 
bank where one earns moral credits as well as deficit as an explanation for moral 
self-licensing. 
Sachdeva et al. (2009) followed a similar thought pattern when establishing the 
framework for the theory of moral self-licensing. In their experiment, participants 
were assigned to one of three priming conditions, where they had to write a short, 
self-referential story focusing on positive, negative or neutral traits in the control 
condition. Participants were then presented with situations or tasks involving moral 
questions and options. It was found that individuals, who had written stories focusing 
on negative traits were more likely to engage in moral behavior, make more moral 
decisions than those who wrote stories focusing on positive or neutral traits. 
Sachdeva et al. (2009) argued that this demonstrated that individuals who affirm 
their moral character feel a license to act immorally, but when this moral balance is 
threatened, they feel the need to undertake moral acts in order to reaffirm their moral 
character. Notably however, as discussed in greater detail below, subsequent 
attempts to replicate these findings have achieved mixed results, with some studies 
failing to replicate the findings (Blanken et al., 2014), while others point to the need 
for far larger participant populations to find any significant effect (Blanken et al., 
2015). 
In their examination of prejudice, Monin and Miller (2001) examined 
expressions of prejudice in situations where participants were given the chance to 
affirm their non-prejudiced status. Subsequently, these participants were more likely 
to expressed a prejudiced attitude or agree with a prejudiced statement. This is 
similarly a case of moral self-licensing. Here, the difference between non-prejudiced 
and prejudiced attitudes represents the difference between moral credit and deficit. 
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This link can be drawn because for many individuals, at least partially due to now 
overwhelming social norms and pressures, the holding of prejudicial attitudes, and 
the expressions of such prejudiced feelings carries a negative and immoral 
connotation (Devine, 1989; Smith, 1985). 
Linking the above descriptions, one possible analogy to moral self-licensing is 
homeostasis. In this specific case, individual homeostatic mechanisms work to 
maintain a level of morality, or goodness, that is most comfortable for the individual. 
Actions and events that cause a deviation in either direction, more or less good, are 
subsequently corrected with an opposite action to restore this level. This analogy is 
similar to theories regarding the homeostatic nature of risk-taking (Hoyes, Stanton & 
Taylor, 1996; Wilde, 1988; Wilde, 1982). 
Work undertaken in the fields of consumer behaviour, economic decision-
making, and related areas, is also vital to understanding the theory. Over a series of 
five experimental studies, Khan and Dhar (2006) found a consistent moral self-
licensing effect, where participants were more likely to engage in an indulgent act or 
consumption, if they had previously undertaken a virtuous act. Further, it was also 
found that this effect was mitigated if participants attributed their earlier virtuous act 
to external motivators, rather than themselves.  
Similarly, Strahilevitz and Myers (1998) undertook two lab-based studies, and 
one field study, examining the use of charitable contribution in promoting 
consumption of luxury or frivolous items, compared to the promotion of everyday 
necessities, such a laundry detergent. In line with the theory of moral self-licensing, 
charitable acts had a significant positive effect in promoting consumption of luxury 
items, but not for everyday necessities. 
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Work in the field of political correctness has also included various studies 
concerning moral self-licensing behaviour. Using a scenario where participants had 
to chose between two job candidates, one white and one African American, Merritt, 
Fein and Savitsky (2009, as cited in Merritt, Effron & Monin, 2010) demonstrated 
that participants engaged in moral behaviour when it was possible they may need to 
engage in moral self-licensing in the near future. Similarly, Effron, Cameron and 
Monin (2009) found individuals who voiced support for then-candidate Barack 
Obama subsequently engaged in licensing behaviour to make or support statements 
that may be interpreted as racist. 
A key point to note is that much previous research focuses on the licensing 
aspect of the theory moral self-licensing theory, while taking the opposite cleansing 
behaviour as a given. While this is legitimate as a focus point of previous research 
(Khan & Dhar, 2006; Monin & Miller, 2001) and other cited above, it does leave 
questions unanswered regarding whether the moral cleansing aspect of the theory 
explains human behaviour in the same fashion.  
Moral Licensing Credits v Credentials 
Merritt et al. (2010) posed the important question of whether the description 
and demonstration of the moral self-licensing effect as included in various studies, 
including the Sachdeva et al. (2009) paper which has spawned numerous attempts at 
replication or extension, concerns a change in the behaviour being licensed, or the 
meaning of that behaviour? In the former, an individual knows whether subsequent 
behaviour is bad or wrong, by they feel licensed to undertake it. In the latter, moral 
self-licensing changes the very meaning of the behaviour to the individual about to 
engage in it. 
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Sachdeva et al. (2009) fit the moral credit explanation. Their self-regulation 
model explanation for moral self-licensing clearly views any negative behaviour as 
having been offset by similar moral actions. Similarly, in Nisan’s (1991) explanation 
of moral self-licensing, that morally negative actions need to be offset by moral 
actions fits squarely, placing it firmly in the moral credit theoretical position. 
Theoretically, this closely follows the above analogy of moral self-licensing as akin 
to homeostasis. Nisan (1991), amongst others, also cites a bank account analogy, 
with good deeds and behaviours as deposits that can subsequent be spent in morally 
dubious behaviour. 
In contrast, work broadly concerning moral self-licensing and racism, for 
example Effron et al. (2009) and Monin and Miller (2001), as well as from other 
areas of moral self-licensing study, fall into the moral credentials camp. In each case, 
an early moral action or behaviour, in both cases the display of non-racist 
behaviours, alters the individual’s perception of subsequent decisions or behaviours 
and leads to morally illegitimate responses. Essentially, as the participants feel that 
since earlier decisions affirmed their non-racist or prejudiced credentials, the 
decision they subsequently make can’t be racist or prejudiced, despite such a belief 
appearing to others as a fallacy. 
Merritt et al. (2010) argued that both theoretical explanations have relatively 
equal supporting data. Additionally, they stated that instead of attempting to prove 
one explanation as superior, moving forward the credit v. credential difference 
should be viewed as different pathways through which individuals may undertake 
moral self-licensing. Under this proposal, this thesis falls more within the credit 
explanation camp, however, elements of the credential explanation are notable at 
times. 
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Some Limited Criticism, and a Justification of, Moral Self-Licensing 
Theory 
Compared with morality, moral structures and the role morality plays more 
generally in individual decision-making, moral self-licensing is a relatively new 
theory with a short research history. While it may be studied in terms of prejudice, 
acting morally, altruism or even under the banner of moral hypocrisy, relatively few 
studies have examined moral self-licensing on its own, as the core focus. This leaves 
the topic open to widespread debate, as well as many questions and criticisms. Some 
of these more general criticisms will be addressed further in a later section, while 
other unanswered questions will be addressed here. 
Since the publication of Sachdeva et al (2009), a number of published and 
unpublished studies have attempted to replicate the findings. Blanken et al. (2014), 
over a series of three experiments, attempted to replicate Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) 
results, including the use of the prime and experimental material as originally 
described without alteration. Across all three studies, Blanken et al. (2014) failed to 
replicate the original findings, with data analysis showing no support for a significant 
effect as explained by the moral self-licensing theory. Blanken et al. (2014) also 
argued their findings demonstrate the original manipulation prime as proposed by 
Sachdeva et al. (2009) is insufficient to induce moral licensing behaviour, and that 
future studies seeking to replicate or extend Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) work should use 
a neutral control condition, primed for neither moral credit or deficit. It is important 
to note, this study was published after the two experiments undertaken for this thesis 
were designed and carried out. 
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Further queries regarding the moral self-licensing theory and effects, as found 
by Sachdeva et al. (2009) are posed by Blanken et al.’s (2015) meta-analysis of 
moral self-licensing research. The meta-analysis covered 91 previous studies, with a 
total of 7,397 participants. The meta-analysis found a Cohen’s d of 0.31, just greater 
than Cohen’s (1977) interpretation of a small effect. Blanken et al. (2015) interpreted 
their findings as implying the need for far larger participant numbers in moral self-
licensing studies than previously used if an effect was to be found, an outcome that 
raises questions about whether such an effect is actually present? Again, it should be 
noted Blanken et al. (2015) was published subsequently to the completion of the 
experiments used in this thesis, and just prior to submission. 
Following these published criticisms, is it possible an alternative theory could 
address the same issues moral self-licensing seeks to? For example, could cognitive 
dissonance explain the very actions moral self-licensing seeks to explain? While 
cognitive dissonance has been examined in a large body of previous research and 
literature, reduction of dissonance is explained through the four established patterns: 
change cognition, justify through changing the conflict, changing through additional 
cognitions, and ignoring the dissonance. However, none of the four methods for 
addressing such dissonance adequately explain the consistent pattern of seemingly 
confliction behaviours: moral and immoral. 
Another possibility is whether moral self-licensing theory could in fact be a 
further case of a general homeostatic theory, along the lines of the behaviours 
inhibitions systems and behaviours activation systems theory (BIS-BAS) (Carver & 
White, 1994). As demonstrated by the analogy above, there are similarities between 
moral self-licensing theory and a homeostatic explanation, but there are also 
differences. In a homeostatic theoretical explanation, if balance is thrown out, the 
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following action will seek to restore this balance, or appropriate level, for example 
level of risk (Wilde, 1988). However, previous moral self-licensing research has 
demonstrated that individuals will continue to move in one direction, either moral or 
immoral, as long as eventually the appropriate level is restored (Sachdeva et al. 
2009). In moral self-licensing, there can be a delay in restoring balance. 
Alternatively, Baron (2008) has argued that there is little difference between 
moral reasoning and other forms of decision-making. Operating on such an 
assumption, a sound theory for any decision-making would also be a good theory for 
moral reasoning. However, if we are to disregard moral reasoning, then how can 
decisions and behaviours that cause pain be explained? Without an important moral 
judgment or value to uphold, which causes decisions that violate hedonic reasoning, 
what is the purpose of such a decision or action? Moral self-licensing theory 
provides such an explanation. 
In addition, a strong response to such a questions lies in the research, such as 
Sachdeva et al. (2009) and Monin and Miller (2001) that utilises the moral self-
licensing theory to explain aspect of human behavior. In such cases, previous 
theories or explanations have failed to adequately address or explain the observed 
decision and behaviours. Furthermore, the validity or moral self-licensing as a theory 
is demonstrated by repeated results consistent with its explanation. 
This thesis does not argue the moral self-licensing is a perfect theory to explain 
patterns of behaviour. Rather it suggests that it is a legitimate theory, and one that 
merits further research. Importantly, as discussed below, it allows for an examination 
of moral decision-making in combination with factors, such as human emotions. 
Emotions in Decision-Making 
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As briefly addressed above, work by Batson (1991), Miller and Eisenberg 
(1998) and McCullough et al. (1997) has tied emotions not just to decision making, 
but as an influence on our moral outlook and motivator for decision-making in 
circumstances concerning moral issues and questions. As Miller and Eisenberg 
(1998) argued, our emotional state directly impacts and motivates various moral 
behaviours or decisions. However, as argued in moral self-licensing theory, such 
behaviours and decisions would subsequently impact individual moral self-
regulation, which again would lead to potential changes in behaviour or decisions 
made, as well as emotional and moral self-regulated states. This potential dual effect 
raises the question of how emotions and emotional state interact with an individual’s 
moral state to result in a moral licensing or cleansing outcome? However, prior to 
addressing this is greater depth, it is important to further explore the role of emotions 
in decision-making, as well as highlight specific emotions, rather than treat as a 
uniform group. 
The somatic marker hypothesis, and supporting research, proposed a 
neurological mechanism in which behaviour, and specifically decision-making, could 
be influenced by emotions, including the lack of an emotional signal (Bechara & 
Damasio, 2005). Previous research has demonstrated its use, and therefore the role of 
emotions, in numerous forms of decision-making, including its proposed role in 
economic behaviour (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). The hypothesis demonstrates the 
importance of emotions, and for this thesis, raises the question of how emotions may 
interact with moral self-licensing theory. 
Clearly the role of human emotions in individual decision-making, and our 
reaction to the outcome of such decisions, cannot be underestimated in its 
importance. However, it is also an area with a patchy research history, where 
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propositions and adages have often entered into common knowledge with little basis 
in rigorous research, and little empirical support. Similarly, emotions are of such 
variety and width, differing from individual to individual, that at times it is difficult 
to examine and study the role of emotions while accounting for this individual 
variation. 
A Case for Gratitude 
As stated above, for this thesis to examine a potential interaction between 
moral self-licensing and emotions, it must identify a singular emotion, not discuss 
emotions as a catchall. However, which emotion should be used in the proceeding 
experiments? Given the wide array of emotions that plays large roles in decision-
making, depending on the context and nature of the decision, narrowing the decision 
down is difficult. In cases of deep interpersonal relationships, the dual emotions of 
love and hate, even betrayal could be argued to be key – and allow for an interesting 
examination of the emotional decision-making differences between the genders. 
Other situations would allow for a more in-depth appraisal of guilt, disgust, fear, or 
instead positive emotions such as joy or happiness. 
Given the first experiment of this thesis will examine the possible interaction 
effects of the interaction between moral self-licensing and a chosen emotion, the 
theory of moral self-licensing may guide this choice. As discussed above, the two 
behavioural poles of moral self-licensing theory, licensing and cleansing behaviour, 
may be viewed, to a degree, as similar to anti-social and prosocial behaviour 
respectively. As has been well established in psychology (George, 1990), as well as 
research in other fields such as consumer behaviour and marketing (Kelley & 
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Hoffman, 1997), affect is a strong influence on both positive and negative disposition 
to prosocial behaviour. 
Given that emotions are strong influences upon individual affect, it is plausible 
that certain emotions and individual emotional mood states, by influencing 
disposition towards or away from prosocial behaviour, would therefore also 
influence individual dispositions to moral licensing or cleansing behaviours. For 
example, if an emotion made an individual more likely to act in a prosocial manner, 
that individual is simultaneously more likely to engage in moral cleansing behaviour. 
Conversely, an emotion that leads to an individual being more averse to prosocial 
actions arguably increases the likelihood of moral licensing behaviour, or at least 
decreases the likelihood of moral cleaning behaviour. Hence, emotions may 
potentially influence moral self-licensing. 
Bartlett and DeSteno (2006) previously argued that one emotion predisposing 
people to prosocial behaviour, and prosocial outcomes, is gratitude. Across a series 
of experiments, Bartlett and DeSteno (2006) demonstrated that inducing gratitude 
increased the likelihood of subsequent prosocial behaviours, even at a cost to the 
individual. Similarly, Grant and Gino (2010) found received expressions of gratitude 
motivated subsequent prosocial behaviours across a number of settings. Therefore, 
altering an individual’s affect through inducing gratitude may plausibly influence 
moral licensing or cleansing outcomes.  
Working within the limitations necessary to undertake moral self-licensing 
research, including the design of materials and hypothetical scenarios, as well as the 
lab setting, the ability to induce, and manipulate, the chosen emotion is perhaps the 
most important factor in determining if it is easy to study. As Bartlett and DeSteno 
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(2006) demonstrated, gratitude may be elicited through minor manipulation, without 
requiring an established interpersonal relationship. Such a manipulation may be 
undertaken with little pressure placed upon the manipulated individual, nor require 
the individual to be subjected to scenarios requiring a negative affect state, which is 
required if manipulating fear or genuine guilt. Emmons and McCullough (2003) 
found in addition that such manipulations could be as simple as record keeping and 
expressing of gratitude itself. 
In contrast, other potential emotions present practical barriers to pairing with 
moral self-licensing studies. Fear, sadness or genuine guilt would all require the 
establishment of a significant negative affect state. However, this would need to be 
accomplished while also presenting relatively straightforward materials attempting to 
manipulate moral state and measure subsequent moral licensing or cleansing 
behaviour, within the known environment of a university psychology faculty 
building. Success within such constraints may require either time, or resources, such 
as confederates, not readily available. 
Given the above, this thesis will initially focus on gratitude as the interacting 
emotion. However before exploring the role of gratitude in decision-making, or the 
manner in which gratitude may be established in a laboratory setting, a working 
definition of gratitude must be established. 
Simmel (1996, pg. 45) previously termed gratitude the “moral memory of 
mankind”. In their 2001 paper, McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons and Larson 
described gratitude as a positive emotion, elicited in circumstances where another 
individual has either attempted to or succeeded in giving one something a value. 
Algoe and Haidt (2009) further argued that gratitude is the emotion responsible for 
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the nurturance of social relationships. Such a definition is well suited to this thesis; it 
is straightforward while outlining certain requirements, which may serve to 
differentiate gratitude from other emotions or emotional states. 
Gratitude as a Guide for Action 
Inherent to this definition of gratitude is the notion of reciprocity. Firstly, it 
relies upon at least the attempt of another individual to give something of value. It 
therefore follows that one will at least attempt to repay such a favour, if an 
opportunity presents itself. As Bartlett and DeSteno (2006) argued, gratitude may act 
as a significant force behind prosocial behavior, and individuals making decisions 
that result in prosocial outcomes. 
In a 2006 study, Bartlett and DeSteno found an increase in attempts by 
individuals to assist another individual, even at a cost to themselves, when the other 
individual could be viewed as a benefactor: someone to whom they feel gratitude. In 
a secondary experiment reported in the same paper, it was found that this effect was 
robust in cases where the benefactor was a stranger. In other words, gratitude may 
function as an incidental emotion, requiring no prior relationship between individuals 
in order to influence behavior (Bartlett et al., 2006). 
McCullough, Emmons and Tsang (2002) investigated differing levels of 
prosocial behavior in two conditions of individuals: those who often experience 
gratitude, and those who experience gratitude less often. Unlike the Bartlett and 
DeSteno (2006) studies, the work of McCullough et al. (2002) did not involve the 
manipulation of participants’ feelings of gratitude. Nonetheless, their results 
indicated that individuals who reported experiencing gratitude more often also 
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reported engaging in prosocial behavior more often when compared to those 
reporting less common feelings of gratitude. 
Such findings support older research into the relationship between prosocial 
behavior and mood. Isen and Levin (1972) and Levin and Isen (1975) found robust 
links between positive mood and a participants likelihood to respond to questions 
and requests in a prosocial manner. However, in their research such an effect was 
found to be limited to cases where such prosocial behavior had limited or no negative 
consequences for the individual. As Bartlett et al. (2006) argued this response was 
still limited by hedonic constraints. 
A Criticism of Gratitude Behaviour Research 
One major criticism of research into the effects of gratitude on decision-
making and behavior is in relation to the negative implications for an individual 
undertaking such behavior. One example is the conflict between staying late at work 
to help a colleague who had previously assisted you, but therefore missing the last 
bus home without an alternative option. Bartlett and DeSteno (2006) and 
McCullough et al. (2002) have demonstrated that short term, negative implications 
have little impact upon prosocial behavior by individuals in high gratitude 
conditions. The question of long-term negative impacts has not been studied. 
Short-term negative impacts on behavior may be minimised by other 
considerations such as repaying a debt, helping a friend or acting in gratitude to 
another. The same argument cannot as easily be made regarding long-term negative 
implications. Such long-term implications can logically be considered to be of a 
more serious nature, as well as have an effect on the individual beyond that, which 
can be expected, planned for or possibly even contemplated. As such, a strong 
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argument may be made that such considerations may negate gratitude’s observed 
effect of increasing prosocial behavior. 
While this criticism of current research is valid, the difficulties in undertaking 
such research it proposes must be acknowledged. Short term, negative consequences 
are easy to create in a laboratory setting, such as Bartlett and DeSteno’s (2006) use 
of a tedious and difficult task. In contrast, long-term negative consequences are far 
harder, if not impossible to manufacture. Furthermore, such implications are more 
likely to be of a serious nature, and hence of a potential dubious ethical nature. While 
it may be possible to make a participant late, thereby missing an important test or 
exam with serious implications for their academic progress with potential long-term 
implications, this would not be ethical. Therefore, while this criticism is valid to a 
degree, a solution is hardly easy to find. 
Gratitude vs Indebtedness 
Research into the link between gratitude and prosocial behavior has 
investigated alternative explanations. Tsang (2006) found that individuals who were 
assigned to a gratitude condition reported and displayed greater levels of prosocial 
behavior. He also investigated whether previous findings were the result of self-
reporting bias or the overt laboratory setting. The possibility that such results were 
caused by the positive mood stemming from acting in a prosocial manner was also 
investigated. 
Rarely addressed is how to differentiate between feelings of gratitude, and 
those of being indebted to another individual. This thesis assumes that the feeling 
and emotion of gratitude is positive. This is one manner in which we may 
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differentiate gratitude from indebtedness. While gratitude is by definition a positive 
feeling, indebtedness is not. The logical emotional response to debt is negative. 
In a study of university students, Nelson, Lust, Story and Ehlinger (2008) 
found clear links between debt, and the subsequent stress caused, and a variety of 
negative health impacts. While that study focused on debt in financial terms, it is not 
implausible to argue that emotional debt would also lead to stress and other negative 
outcomes. 
However, a purely emotional differentiation cannot be the only way to separate 
gratitude from indebtedness. Rather, it may be useful to view the two emotional 
states as related, but not necessarily indicative of the other. If we view gratitude as 
the primary emotion, and indebtedness as the secondary emotion, then it is logical to 
argue that the individual still feels a degree of indebtedness, that they “owe” the 
other something. If we instead view indebtedness as the primary emotion, it is not 
logical to argue for feelings of gratitude. Gratitude does not follow on from 
indebtedness; even through indebtedness may follow from gratitude. In this sense, it 
is a one-way road. Gratitude may entail indebtedness, but indebtedness does not 
entail gratitude. 
Stigma in Moral and Gratitude Scenarios 
The discussion above is concerned with how individuals comprehend notions 
such as morality and emotions such as gratitude, as well as the role these may 
theoretically play in decision-making. Another angle should also be considered. In 
any situation, decisions can be made in violation of established factors: morality and 
gratitude. What happens to people when they violate moral codes, both their own or 
societies? Similarly, what happens when people are viewed to disregard the societal 
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importance placed on gratitude? The outcome of such violations, and the threat of 
these outcomes, may itself be a factor in the decisions made, or even used as a 
behavioural license itself (Moore, Stuart & Pozner, 2010; Moore, Stuart & Pozner, 
2011). 
 It is also important to consider public consequences of moral code violations. 
Although violation of one’s own moral code is intrinsically personal, under certain 
circumstances there may be public implications. These implications may depend 
upon the shared-value and importance of the moral code, as well as how severe the 
violation. In cases where individuals violate society’s codes, stigma is the common 
outcome, and although stigma is often seen, it is only partially understood. 
It is an all too common occurrence that following investigations or 
whistleblowers a major public company is found to have been involved in serious 
forms misconduct. It may have evaded taxes, misrepresented its financial position, 
misrepresented the safety of its products, as in the famous example of tobacco 
companies, or any number of other serious examples of business misconduct. In light 
of such information, share value and profits plunge, along with public confidence in 
the company (Baucus & Baucus, 1997; Akhigbe, Kudla & Madura, 2005). In some 
cases the drop in consumer confidence is so severe, and the results so financially 
harsh, that the company goes bankrupt. What these companies are experiencing is 
stigma. 
In their 2010 paper, Moore et al. defined stigma as the result of public 
admissions of misconduct. However, for the purpose of this thesis, a definition based 
in economics is inappropriate. This thesis will use Goffman’s (1963) definition of 
stigma as spoiled identity. Where moral violations occur, the spoilage of identity is 
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discreditation and distrust, as well as possible outrage, revulsion or fear. As used in 
this these, the caveat is that such violations must be of significant importance to 
warrant societal interests, and therefore result in widely accepted stigma. 
As Moore et al. (2010) acknowledge, while the results of stigma can de 
devastating, such risks have not adversely affected the number of firms willing to 
engage in misconduct and therefore risk public stigma, and its pitfalls. Davidson, 
Worrell and Lee (1994) estimated that, in the US, more than 50% of large business 
firms engage in some form of ethical or moral misconduct. More than half of large 
firms are willing to risk stigma, but why? 
Moore et al. (2010) proposed that this may be the result of many firms 
believing that a well established set of actions allows them to recover from any 
affects that stigma may have. Such actions are well known to anyone who reads the 
business section of the national papers: replacing a CEO or management in the wake 
of public misconduct. Moore et al. (2010) argued that such a change in personal is 
believed to demonstrate to the public that the firm has realized that its previous 
actions were wrong, and that it is determined to move in a different direction. 
However, does such an explanation hold up to statistical scrutiny, or is it merely an 
untested belief? 
In their paper, Moore et al. (2010) answer their own question with a two-part 
response. While they find evidence that changes in leadership may help insulate a 
firm that has admitted wrongdoing but is yet to be affected or tainted by stigma, little 
evidence suggests that such tactics help firms that have already been tainted. 
The Repeat Offender 
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Anybody with significant exposure to children, whether as a parent or from a 
professional viewpoint, such as a teacher or childcare worker, knows that for young 
people labeled “problem children”, certain behaviour becomes part of the 
expectation. Misconduct is something to be expected, and rationalised as “oh, that’s 
just x.” 
Can we apply the same logic beyond children? Moore et al. (2010) also 
examined the case of business recidivists. They argued that little work has been done 
looking into cases where misconduct, and the resulting stigma, may be viewed as 
anything other than a one-off affair. Existing research largely concerns the world of 
organized criminal enterprise. While criminologists have widely established that a 
prior criminal record is one of the best predictor variables for future criminal 
behaviour (U.S. Department of Justice, 2000), what about businesses, or public 
organisations? 
Moore et al. (2010) found evidence for what they term a behavioural licensing 
effect of stigma. To explain this, parallels are drawn to effects observed in previous 
psychological research, where it was found that elements of the mentally 
handicapped and disabled communities, used the stigma associated with their 
condition as a behaviour license; to escape those expectations other members of 
society are bound by (Haber, & Smith, 1971). For businesses, the initial act of 
misconduct, and resulting stigma, gives license to further acts of misconduct, without 
the fear of similar consequences. Rather, subsequent acts of misconduct instead 
result in reduced penalties, thereby negating the risk factors associated with stigma. 
Can We Assume Similarities to Gratitude Violations? 
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While the above research may be understood to refer to moral violations, can 
we assume that similar patterns exist if the moral violation is changed to one of 
gratitude violation? The author of this thesis is aware of no research addressing this 
topic, however, certain assumptions are plausible. 
As previously stated, and explored in greater detail below, we may view 
gratitude, and societal expectations regarding it, in a similar manner to how we view 
morality. Generally, it is expected that individuals will behave in a way conducive of 
moral expectations. Similarly, a general view is held that expects individuals to 
behave in line with public expectations regarding gratitude.  In both cases, certain 
behaviours are expected, and violations are frowned on. The individual who morally 
transgresses may be viewed as an “unsanitary sort”, while the individual who does 
not respond with gratitude in the appropriate manner may be regarded as rude or 
unlikeable. As reactions to both violations is similar, it is not a great leap to assume 
that stigma may hold similar consequences for those who fail to demonstrate 
gratitude, and those who have a consistent behaviour pattern of such failure. 
Risk-Taking in Morality and Gratitude 
As reported by McCullough et al. (2001), societies at large hold both morality 
and gratitude in high regard. Both are seen as desirable traits to display and hold, 
while to display the opposite, or to be judged as lacking in one or the other is 
considered a negative. If we may assume that the majority of individuals wish to 
avoid negative judgments and impressions amongst their peers, then it follows to 
reason that risk-taking, in scenarios where morality, one’s moral code, or the 
appearance of ingratitude, is concerned is a topic worth addressing. Specifically, 
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could an individual’s propensity to risk, or the perceived risk involved, actively 
moderate moral or immoral behaviour, or the display of, or lack of gratitude? 
In wake of the collapse of Bernard Madoff’s ponzi scheme, a fraud that robbed 
thousands of investors of their life savings, one major subject of reports concerned 
accusations of immorality.  As one article stated, the Madoff fraud was not just a 
story of financial disaster, it was a story of the failure of morality (Quinn, 2008). In 
Ayal and Gino’s (2011) paper “Honest Rationales for Dishonest Behaviour”, the 
author’s assert that crimes such as fraud, cheating and racketeering are some of the 
greatest challenges facing society at this time. However, they also hold that such 
crimes and behaviours represent the unethical, and immoral problems society faces. 
However, the authors also stated that while cases such as Madoff and Enron, or HIH 
Insurance to take a local example, often grab the media headlines, the rise in immoral 
and unethical behaviour is far more widespread (Ayal & Gino, 2011). 
This raises the question: if such behaviour is on the rise, but simultaneously 
risks individual societal standing due to the importance placed on morality and the 
display of gratitude, why do so many take the risk? While there is a whole debate to 
be had over the supposed decline of societal morality, ethics and emotions such as 
gratitude, this thesis takes no part in such an argument. Rather, it is more important 
to address why people would take such risks. 
Findings from numerous studies, such as Mazar, Amir and Ariely (2008) have 
demonstrated in a laboratory setting that many individuals are willing to engage in 
small amounts of immoral behaviour, such as cheating, if they believe the chances 
they will be caught are low. Ayal and Gino (2011) argued that such findings are 
troubling as they demonstrate the folly of “the few bad apples theory”: that a few 
	 	 MORAL	LICENSING	AND	CLEANSING	 37	
individuals undertake most immoral behaviour. They contend that a more accurate 
proposal would be that immoral behaviour is the result of many apples going off just 
a little. Ayal and Gino (2011) provide one possible explanation for risk-taking, even 
where morality is concerned; the presence of other individuals who themselves are 
engaged in similar, immoral behaviour allows people to undertake such behaviour, 
while continuing to hold a view regarding the high importance of moral behaviour. 
However, it is important to note that the limitations of the preposition underlying this 
explanation. For example, Australian Federal Police statistics demonstrated that just 
twelve families in Canberra are responsible for a quarter of all property crime, 
including armed robbery, home burglary, car theft, shoplifting and vandalism (Bucci, 
2011). Such figures challenge the idea of many apples going a little off. 
While it is tempting to dismiss Ayal and Gino’s (2011) explanation as akin to 
the child’s cry of “but everyone else is doing it”, significant research in the domain 
of social comparison has shown such an explanation to hold merit. Becker (1968) 
demonstrated that individuals observe other peoples’ immoral behaviour to gauge the 
cost-benefit ratio of certain transgressions. Similarly, Gino and Pierce (2009) argued 
that individuals may judge the frequency of immoral behaviour and use such 
judgments to draw boundaries between what is and isn’t moral and ethical. 
Controlling for Social Comparison in Risk-Taking 
If we therefore accept that individuals often use others’ behaviour as a baseline 
in morality judgments, calculating the risk involved in engaging in immoral or 
ungrateful behaviour, and with subsequent decisions or behaviours moderated by this 
risk, controlling for this moderator effect is the best option. 
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Weber, Blais and Betz (2002) provide one option. Their Domain-Specific Risk-
Attitude Scale measures perceptions of risk and risk-taking in individuals using five 
domains: financial decisions, health-safety, recreational, ethical and social decisions. 
Respondents are presented with a set of behaviours and asked the gauge how likely it 
is that they would engage in each. They are then asked to rate how great a risk they 
perceive each to be, and how beneficial they view each action/behaviour/decision to 
be. In 2006, Blais and Weber proposed an updated version of their scale, consisting 
of the same five domains, but with a reduced number of items. This scale was also 
designed to be an applicable to wider age groups, given that the original scale 
focused heavily on issues likely to resonate with young adults. Of the domains, 
ethical is most relevant moral self-licensing theory, and hence Experiment 1. 
Both versions of the scale have been found to have good reliability and validity 
(Webber et al., 2002; Blais & Webber, 2006). Additionally, both have now become 
widely used scales to determine individual attitudes regarding risk-taking behaviour. 
As such, both scales provide a potential tool to control for attitudes regarding risk-
taking in moral and gratitude scenarios that run counter to the widely researched and 
accepted view that society holds morality and gratitude to be extremely important. 
Morality and Gratitude 
Some previous research has examined links between individual morality and 
the emotion of gratitude. One of the key areas previously examined was whether 
gratitude itself may be considered an outcome of morality, and hence whether our 
individual moral codes and compass in turn influence how, and to what extent, we 
experience gratitude. 
	 	 MORAL	LICENSING	AND	CLEANSING	 39	
In their paper “Is Gratitude a Moral Affect” McCullough et al. (2001) proposed 
that gratitude may be conceptualised as an emotional moral affect: synonymous with 
other morality driven emotions such as guilt. McCullough et al. (2001) questioned 
why much recent study of emotion has tended to ignore gratitude, citing examples 
such as Fehre and Russell’s (1984) work concerning emotional wording. Greenberg 
(1980) has argued that psychology has a tendency to discount gratitude as 
indebtedness, and related notions, despite the differences discussed above. To 
counter this lack of research and discussion, McCullough et al. (2001) proposed that 
we should conceive gratitude similarly to how we conceive guilt. While guilt is 
viewed as an individual’s response to a failure to treat other individuals in line with 
their moral code (Baumeister, 1998), so should gratitude be the emotional response 
to another’s moral action towards you. Additionally, gratitude is argued to be what 
McCullough et al. (2001) term a “moral barometer”, an emotional that may be used 
to measure change in individual’s social relationships; in this case an action to 
benefit another. 
DeSteno, Baumann, Bartlett, Williams and Dickens (2010) further this 
argument to view gratitude as inherently stemming from morality. In their view, 
previous work separately linking both morality and gratitude to prosocial behavior 
serves as implicit evidence that a clear relationship exists. They argued both 
functions have been shown to increase the rate of prosocial behavior, both self-
reported and in laboratory settings. In their own study, DeSteno et al. (2010) 
assigned 84 participants to one of four conditions: control or gratitude, and either 
benefactor or stranger. Differences in prosocial behaviour were then measured 
between those who were manipulated into feeling gratitude and those in the control 
edition. Additionally, differences in prosocial behaviour as directed towards either 
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the preceding benefactor, or a stranger was measured. This experiment clearly 
supported previous findings. DeSteno and others (2010) subsequently argued that 
such results demonstrated a link between cooperative as opposed to selfish 
behaviour, and gratitude, itself stemming from a position of morality. 
Further research on links between morality and gratitude has approached this 
question from a religious standpoint, or utilising a religious view of morality and 
moral codes. As McCullough et al. (2001) stated, both morality and the emotion of 
gratitude are highly prized and venerated in many of the world’s religions, including 
Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism. McCullough et al. (2001) 
even quote Seneca, who damns ingratitude as a moral failure. 
An Initial Proposed Criticism 
Moral self-licensing is a very young theory. Papers exploring the topic 
specifically are small in number, and while aspects of the theory have been discussed 
in research for some decades, it is only in the last decade that the theory has become 
a topic of interest in psychology. Because of this, literature criticizing the theory and 
the findings of current studies is virtually non-existent. 
In partial contrast, gratitude has been widely studied, with various theories 
refined over years of study and change. However, the theories continue to be 
debated, and it would not be possible to state firmly that theories regarding gratitude 
and its importance in society, or the consequences of disregarding its role in 
behaviour of decision-making, are either widely accepted or well established. 
While neither theory currently encounters significant criticism in mainstream 
psychological research, this thesis proposes one major criticism. Research directly 
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addressing moral self-licensing theory, such as Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) studies, 
Khan and Dhar (2006), Strahilevitz and Myers (1998) or other research cited above, 
has addressed moral self-licensing seemingly in a theoretical vacuum. Unlike many 
more established theories, moral self-licensing has yet to be examined on a more 
multi-dimensional level – including variables and conditions that may serve to 
negate or mutate the effects explained by moral self-licensing. This thesis will seek 
to at last partially address this. 
A further criticism is that, possibly due to the relative recent nature of 
psychological research in the field, the current literature makes little allowance for 
individual differences in psychological measurements. Given that work on moral 
self-licensing inevitably involves questions of risk-taking, and resulting hypothetical 
stigma resulting from participant’s decisions, it would seem logical that measures of 
propensity for risk-taking, personal cost-benefit risk analyses and the like be 
included. Rather, current research has tended to assume that participants simply 
conform to mean scores on any such measures. 
This assumption limits previous research, and a full understanding of the 
applicability of the theory in a number of ways. While moral self-licensing theory 
seeks to explain an observed pattern of behaviour, presenting it as a uniform 
explanation glosses over what may be important elements of its theoretical 
application. In turn, this limits to how accurately the theory may be used to predict 
behaviour, as well as explain differences and nuances observed in moral decision-
making scenarios. 
In addition to the lack of previous focus on the role risk-taking may have 
played in the observed findings, and the application of moral self-licensing theory to 
	 	 MORAL	LICENSING	AND	CLEANSING	 42	
explain observed behaviour, what of factors such as individual personality traits? Is it 
possible, or plausible, that moral self-licensing, as an explanation for decision-
making, may be affected by personality? Put another way, is moral self-licensing 
more likely in individuals who score highly, or lowly, of certain measures on the 
NEO-PI-R, or MMPI? An argument may be made that, of the Big 5 personality 
traits, individuals with high scores on the agreeableness and conscientiousness 
measures are more inclined towards prosocial behaviours, and therefore more likely 
to engage in moral cleansing, prosocial and moral behaviours, while less likely to 
engage in the moral licensing, anti-social and immoral behaviours. Furthermore, 
what of people with score highly on measures of Machiavellianism? Arguably, they 
would be the opposite of those with high scores on the Big 5 agreeableness and 
conscientiousness measures, and instead be more inclined towards licensing 
behaviours. Similarly, how may impulsivity affect the application of the theory? 
While this thesis cannot address all these criticisms, answers to the above questions 
may have significant implications. 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 aimed to test for moral self-licensing, the effects of gratitude on 
decision-making, and joint moral self-licensing-gratitude interaction effects on 
decision-making in morally balanced hypothetical scenarios. Utilising a series of 
hypothetical scenarios, including one based on Sachdeva et al. (2009), and a 
gratitude task based on Bartlett and DeSteno (2006), Experiment 1 also sought to 
examine a possible relationship between risk-taking and moral self-licensing 
behaviour over a variety of situations. A non-gratitude condition was also included 
as a manipulation check on the gratitude prime. Experiment 1 used a moral priming 
tool based on one such tool utilised by Sachdeva et al. (2009). In addition, risk-
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taking was controlled for by the use of the Ethical subset of the Domain-Specific 
Risk-Attitude scale (Weber et al., 2002). 
It was hypothesised that participants would exhibit moral self-licensing 
behaviour along the lines of the moral prime tool: those primed into a moral deficit 
condition would exhibit increased cleansing, and therefore morally positive 
behaviour, and those in a moral credit condition would exhibit increased licensing, 
and therefore morally negative behaviour. 
It was also hypothesised that the gratitude condition would interact with the 
moral prime: gratitude would inhibit and lessen licensing behaviour, and increase 
cleansing behaviour. Finally, this thesis hypothesised that higher scores on the 
Ethical subscale of the Domain-Specific Risk-Attitude scale would positively 
correlate with moral licensing decisions, and negatively correlate with moral 
cleansing decisions, while lower scores would positively correlate with moral 
cleansing decisions and negatively correlate with moral licensing decisions. 
Experiment 1 Method 
Participants 
Experiment 1 had 104 participants (32 male, 72 female), whose ages ranged 
from 17 to 40 years, with a mean of 19.71 (SD = 3.017).  Participants were 
Australian National University undergraduate students. Participants received either 
$10, or 1-hour course credit if enrolled in first year psychology, for their 
participation. 
Design 
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Experiment 1 utilised a 2 (moral credit v. moral deficit priming) x 2 (presence 
v. absence of gratitude) between subjects experimental design.  
Materials 
In Experiment 1, participants were required to undertake a questionnaire, made 
up of three parts. 
Participants initially undertook a moral self-licensing prime, either a moral 
credit or moral deficit condition, using questions based upon Sachdeva et al. (2009). 
The questions used are presented in Table 1. 
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The second portion of the questionnaire was an unrelated distracter task, 
undertaken on a computer. The distractor task was a normative choice study 
designed by the author’s supervisor. The computer was coded to malfunction and 
freeze randomly in 50% of cases, forming part of the gratitude prime. For the control 
Table 1 
Experiment 1 Moral Self-Licensing Priming Tool 
Prime Condition Priming Question 
  
Moral credit 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in 
this research. 
This study aims to explore decision-
making and moral choice. 
First however, please take a moment to 
think about how you would describe 
yourself if you were writing a journal, 
or similar personal description. 
In the space provided below please 
write a short (100-200 words) passage 
describing yourself. However, please 
focus on the positive traits, using only 
positive nouns and descriptive 
phrases. 
  
Moral deficit Thank you for agreeing to take part in 
this research. 
This study aims to explore decision-
making and moral choice. 
First however, please take a moment to 
think about how you would describe 
yourself if you were writing a journal, 
or similar personal description. 
In the space provided below please 
write a short (100-200 words) passage 
describing yourself. However, please 
focus on the negative traits, using 
only negative nouns and descriptive 
phrases. 	
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condition that did not include the gratitude prime, no freeze was experienced. This 
prime was based on the method used by Bartlett and DeSteno (2006).  
Participants were then asked to complete the final part of the experiment. This 
section contained 3 scenarios, which presented participants with the option to act in a 
more or less moral manner. The first scenario was based upon that of Sachdeva et al. 
(2009), where participants are told they are the manager of a factory, which emits 
toxic chemicals. Participants were then informed that the company had agreed to 
filter a percentage of these emissions; however this was a costly process. Questions 
relating to how often the participants would apply the filter, as well as how risky they 
thought it would be to not filter were then asked. The subsequent two scenarios also 
were modelled after Sachdeva et al. (2009), however they made use of different 
hypothetical settings and relationships. Scenario two utilised the parent-child 
relationship, while scenario three used a university setting. Scenario three is 
presented below in Table 2. 
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Participants then completed the Ethical subset of Weber et al.’s (2002) 
Domain-Specific Risk-Attitude scale. Previous peer-reviewed research has 
demonstrated the validity and consistency of this scale (Blais & Weber, 2006). The 
2002 version of this scale was used as the questions are more appropriate for 
university-aged individuals, where as the 2006 updated scale poses questions 
applicable to older individuals. Hence it was felt that the 2002 version matched the 
expected participants’ age range more closely. 
Table 2 
Example of moral choice paradigm: university setting 
 
You are in the 3rd and final year of your Bachelors degree at ANU. While your overall 
grade average is good, you have been really struggling in one of your courses, and are 
on the borderline of either passing or failing. 
If you fail this class, it will mean you are unable to graduate at the end of the year and 
will have to return the following year for another semester. Additionally, you will no 
longer be able to take up your dream job offer, as your prospective employer requires 
that you hold a university degree. 
By luck, a close friend of yours is the Teacher’s Assistant for the course you are 
struggling in. Knowing what is at stake for you, your friend offers you an answer guide 
to part of the forthcoming exam, which would enable you to pass the course and go 
onto graduate. However, if you were caught, you would be severely punished by the 
university, as would your friend, with both of you possibly being expelled from ANU. 
1. In this situation, do you: A) accept your friends offer, therefore cheating on the 
exam and passing the course and graduating, although risk being caught. Or B) 
thank your friend but reject his offer, and attempt to complete the course 
honestly? 
2. Placed in a similar situation, which option do you think your best friend would 
take? Option A or B? 
3. On a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being highly unlikely, 5 being neither unlikely nor 
likely, and 10 being highly likely, what do you think is the likelihood of you 
being caught cheating? 
4. On a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being not at all serious, 5 being neither non serious 
nor serious, and 10 being extremely serious, how serious do you believe this 
act of cheating is? 
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Two small changes to questions in Weber et al.’s (2002) scale were made to 
better reflect Australian language and applicable situations. These were changing the 
word “term paper” to “major assignment” and changing a question about stealing 
cable television to one about stealing a neighbour’s WiFi internet connection. A copy 
of Experiment 1 materials is contained in Appendix A. 
Procedure 
Participants were first given a small briefing about the experiment, informing 
them that the purpose of the experiment was to investigate possible links between 
decision-making and an individual’s morality. Participants were also told that the 
individual with them running the experiment was in fact a junior “research assistant”, 
rather than the experimenter themself. This was done to break down lines-of-
authority, and attempt to construct a confederate type situation, important for the 
gratitude prime. The briefing also informed participants that the research was 
comprised of three sections, all questionnaire style, and that since this was about 
their own personal judgment, participants were requested not to communicate with 
anyone other than the individual running the experiment. Finally, participants were 
reminded that they may withdraw at any time. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either moral credit or moral deficit for 
the moral prime, with the experimenter blind to which condition each participant was 
in. 
Participants then undertook section two, which was computer based. In 50% of 
cases, randomly assigned by the computer program, the computer was coded to 
freeze and not allow participants to continue for a period of 90 seconds. During this 
process the “research assistant” indicated to the participant that there had been 
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problems with the new software, and that they may have to return another day, 
starting the experiment from the beginning. The experimenter would then attempt to 
“fix” the computer problem through various settings to use up what remained of the 
90 seconds, after which the computer would un-freeze. Participants would then 
continue with section two of the experiment, with gratitude to the “research 
assistant” for their help. 
Finally, participants were presented with a booklet containing the three moral 
choice scenarios, as well as the Ethical subset of the Domain-Specific Risk-Attitude 
scale. Following this, participants were asked whether they were willing to undertake 
a further, time-consuming experiment. This acted as a test for gratitude, though no 
experiment was undertaken if the participant responded affirmatively.  
Upon completion of the experiment, participants were given a debriefing 
document, explaining to them the manipulations used in the experiment, as well as 
the aims and hypotheses of the research. 
Experiment 1 Results 
Data Screening and Cleaning 
Data screening and cleaning, as well as subsequent analysis was performed 
using IBM SPSS Statistics 20 for Mac. Dependent variables were assessed for 
measures of skew and kurtosis. Data from the first scenario indicated slight negative 
skew and significant positive kurtosis. Data from the second scenario revealed 
significant positive skew, while the third scenario data revealed significant negative 
skew. Both transformation and recoding of data were inappropriate due to the form 
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of responses. Box-plots revealed no significant univariate outliers, whilst 
Mahalanobis distance evaluation showed no multivariate outliers. 
Missing values analysis was carried out, revealing a number of missing values. 
One participant had failed to complete the majority of the experiment and was 
excluded. Missing values analysis revealed other missing values were spread 
randomly throughout the data, and accounted for less than 2% of responses. The 
“exclude cases pair wise option” was therefore selected for subsequent SPSS 
analysis. Missing values analysis also revealed two cases of missing data in 
responses to the Ethical subset Domain-Specific Risk-Attitude scale (Weber et al., 
2002). In both cases mean substitution was used, to produce risk-taking ratings. 
Risk-taking ratings were also subsequently recoded for future analysis, with ratings 
below the mean recoded to 0, and those above the mean to 1. 
Initial Descriptive Analysis and Confidence Intervals 
Primary descriptive statistics revealed mixed results. Mean filtering in Scenario 
1 was higher in the moral credit condition than the moral deficit condition. 
Additionally, mean filtering was higher in the gratitude prime condition than without 
the gratitude prime. This is shown in Table 3. Further primary descriptive statistics 
indicated no interaction effect between the moral and gratitude primes. 
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The effect of both the moral self-licensing and gratitude primes was examined 
in Scenarios 2 and 3 using paired difference confidence intervals. In Scenario 2, 
lying to one’s parents, a 95% CI [-0.38, -0.14] was found under the moral prime, 
with a 95% CI [-0.38, -0.12] for the presence or absence of gratitude prime, both 
indicating a negative correlation between the primes and lying. In Scenario 3, 
cheating on an exam, a 95% CI [0.19, 0.43] was found for the moral prime, and a 
95% CI [0.21, 0.45] for presence v. absence of gratitude prime, indicating a positive 
correlation between the primes and cheating. It should be noted however, that in both 
Scenarios, initial data was heavily skewed.	
The effect of personal risk-taking was also examined for Scenarios 2 and 3. In 
Scenario 2, a 95% CI [-0.44, -0.19] was found for above v. below mean of risk-
taking, indicating a negative correlation between risk-taking and lying, and a 95% CI 
[0.14, 0.38] for Scenario 3, indicating a positive correlation between risk-taking and 
cheating. 
Table 3 
Participant Mean Filtering Levels for Experiment 1, Scenario 1 
Filter Dependent Variable   
 Moral Credit Prime Condition Moral Deficit Prime 
Condition 
Participant 54.86 51.44 
Hypothetical Other 
Manager 
50.68 48.56 
 Gratitude Prime Condition No Gratitude Prime 
Condition 
Participant 54.49 52.36 
Hypothetical Other 
Manager 
53.33 46.30 
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Repeated Measures 
Data was subsequently analysed using repeated measures ANOVA to test 
significance of moral and gratitude prime conditions. The 2x3 repeated measures 
ANOVA was set up with factor1 = which response (i.e. questions 1 and 2) and 
factor2 = the prime (moral, gratitude, combined). As with all repeated measures 
ANOVAs, the two factors represent the related groups of data. In this case, factor1 is 
the group of responses to the various questions, while factor2 is the primes group. 
Such analysis was repeated for Scenarios 1, 2 and 3. 
ANOVA analysis revealed no significant results. The between-subjects effects 
Test for Scenario 1 showed F(1,98) = 0.98, p = 0.33 for the moral prime, and F(1,98) 
= 3.07, p = 0.083 for the gratitude prime, with F(1,98) = 0.43, p = 0.51 for both 
primes combined. In Scenario 2, the moral prime had an effect of F(1,97) = 0.24, p = 
0.62, with a gratitude prime effect of F(1,97) = 0.28, p = 0.60, and the same result for 
the combined effect of both primes. In Scenario 3, the moral prime had an effect of 
F(1,100) = 0, p = 0.99, gratitude prime an effect of F(1,100) = 0.02, p = 0.89 and 
both primes F(1,100) = 1.18, p = 0.28. 
Repeated measures ANOVAs were also used to test for significance of risk-
taking. The 2x3 repeated measures was set up with factor1 as above and factor2 = 
risk. The ANOVA revealed a significant effect for risk-taking in Scenario 2, F(1,99) 
= 5.78, p = 0.018. In Scenarios 1 and 3, the p values were 0.27 and 0.395 
respectively. 
Bayesian Analysis 
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Given the lack of significant results, Bayes factor analyses, and required Paired 
Samples T-Tests, were undertaken. While standard statistical analysis only allows for 
the rejection of the null hypothesis, it cannot actually confirm the null. Given the 
number of insignificant results and failure to find significant effects, analysis to 
confirm the null would allow for further understanding and interpretation of the 
results. Bayes factor analysis would allow for confirmation of the null. This analysis 
was based on the Bayesian theories discussed in Rouder, Morey, Speckman and 
Province (2012) and Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morye and Iverson (2009). Bayesian 
analysis was undertaken using the University of Missouri’s online Bayesian T-Test 
tool. 
Tests for Scenario 1 showed t(101) = 1.90, p = 0.06. The resulting Bayes 
factors were a JZS Bayes Factor of 2.22, a Unit-Information Bayes Factor of 1.74 
and a BIC Odds Bayes Factor of 1.70. For Scenario 2, results of t(100) = 1.92, p= 
0.06, with a JZS Bayes Factor of 2.14, a Unit-Information Bayes Factor of 1.67 and a 
BIC Odds Bayes Factor of 1.63. For Scenario 3, results of t(103) = 2.59, p = 0.01, 
with a JZS Bayes Factor of 0.51, a Unit-Information Bayes Factor of 0.40 and a BIC 
Odds Bayes Factor of 0.38. 
Bayes factor results for Scenarios 1 and 2 did not allow for the confirmation of 
the null hypothesis and are classed as barely worth mentioning (Jeffreys, 1961). 
Results for Scenario 3 indicate support for the null hypothesis. 
Experiment 1 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 failed to support the hypotheses that moral deficit 
priming will lead to increased pro-social behaviour, and that moral credit priming 
will lead to increases in immoral behaviour. Under three separate scenarios requiring 
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individuals to choose actions that would benefit either themselves or others (the 
community at large), no significant effects were found. 
These findings contradict Sachdeva et al. (2009) who found perceived threats 
to moral identity lead to increased attempts to regain self-worth, while affirmation of 
moral identity provides a license to act immorally. The results also conflict with 
Effron et al.’s (2009) findings of endorsement of (then) Senator Obama and 
subsequent pro-White biased expressions, and Monin and Miller’s (2001) findings 
regarding establishment of non-prejudicial credentials and subsequent politically 
incorrect statements. Further, this lack of moral self-licensing effect differs from 
Khan and Dhar’s (2006) work on moral self-licensing in choices of luxury and 
utilitarian consumption.  
Similarly this thesis’s results are inconsistent with Bartlett and DeSteno (2006) 
who found that gratitude increased efforts to undertake either pro-social behaviour, 
or actions that the participant was aware were beneficial to others. In addition, the 
findings contradict the theoretical work of Simmel (1996), and the view of gratitude 
as a decision-making emotion. This experiment also did not find a statistically 
significant combined effect or interaction between the two primes. Previous 
published studies had not examined such interaction, and hence no comparison is 
possible. 
Limited support was found for the effect of risk-taking measures as a predictor 
of behaviour or future decisions. Results from Scenario 2 indicate a significant effect 
for risk-taking measures, though this result was not repeated across Scenarios 1 or 3. 
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Finally, comparing the decisions made by participants as themselves, or as a 
hypothetical other, no significant difference was found between results. Indeed, 
Bayesian analysis indicates that in Scenario 3, the result support the null hypothesis. 
Failure of Priming? 
The failure to replicate, or at least produce results somewhat in line with 
previous research requires consideration of the design and methodology of 
Experiment 1. One possibility is that the primes for moral self-licensing and 
gratitude were either insufficient or flawed. 
Moral Self-Licensing Prime 
Experiment 1 used a moral self-licensing prime based on Sachdeva et al. 
(2009), itself a modification of one shown to affect moral identity by Reed, Aquino 
and Levy (2007) in cases of brand identity and goodwill. However, in Reed et al.’s 
(2007) prime, participants were presented with specific, hypothetical circumstances 
of moral behaviour intended to affect their moral state. Similarly, Sachdeva et al. 
(2009) required participants to initially read a list of words that were positive, 
negative or neutral, and consider the meaning of each word. Participants were then 
required to write a short story about themselves including all the words on the list. 
In contrast, the prime used in Experiment 1 merely required the story element 
of Sachdeva et al. (2009), and neither the initial list of words for later use, nor the 
specific hypothetical example of Reed et al. (2007). It is possible that by allowing 
participants the freedom to produce their own story, with neither the specifics of a 
pre-created hypothetical, nor the enforced language and length of the list and short 
story option, the prime used in Experiment 1 failed to correctly affect the moral self 
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view of participants. However, this cannot be confirmed however to the absence of a 
manipulation check, such as a neutral condition. 
A further possible explanation is that, by not utilising a list of specific traits, 
such as Sachdeva et al. (2009), the prime used in Experiment 1 was open to the 
inclusion of amoral positive and negative characteristics. While the use of traits such 
as physically attractive, artistic, athletic etc., fits within the broad scope of positive 
and negative traits, they do not have a specific moral implication. The use of such 
traits by participants would allow them to complete the prime tool, but not actually 
be morally primed as intended. As with the above explanation however, the lack of 
manipulation check means this explanation cannot be confirmed. 
Gratitude Prime 
Similarly to the moral prime, it is possible that modification also reduced the 
effectiveness of the gratitude prime used in Experiment 1. The original prime used 
by Bartlett and DeSteno (2006) utilised female confederates who were blind to the 
hypotheses of the study. Additionally, their prime included tasks with joint scores to 
ensure legitimacy of subsequent gratitude priming behaviour between the participant 
and the confederate. Such a process, while long, allowed gratitude and emotional 
development between the participant and confederate over a period of time. While 
Experiment 1 used a gratitude manipulation tasks very similar to Bartlett and 
DeSteno (2006), it did not use actual confederates or the prior tasks, which provided 
a level of legitimacy to subsequent emotional interaction. Such simplifications were 
required given gratitude was not the only focus of Experiment 1, and recreating the 
original prime would have adversely impacted the test for moral self-licensing. 
However it is also possible that removing the prior tasks, which provided emotional 
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legitimacy, meant participants viewed this manipulation as an isolated experiment, 
without the development towards gratitude and desire to help. 
It is also important to consider the deception alternative used in place of 
confederates in Experiment 1. For Bartlett and DeSteno (2006), the female 
confederates had the dual advantages of being unable to accidentally give away the 
true purpose of the study, and having no power imbalance in the confederate-
participant relationship. This lack of power imbalance was not replicated in 
Experiment 1 using the deception mechanism.  
While participants may view a research assistant, the deception used, as less an 
authority than an experimenter, in this case presented as a Professor in the 
Psychology Department, they still hold higher authority than the participant. As 
demonstrated by research examining student-tutor relationships in higher education 
(Spencer-Oatey, 1997) and the nursing field (Stephenson, 1984), students see 
authority in student teachers such as tutors and research assistants. As such, rather 
than removing the authority imbalance, which was the aim of the deception, it 
merely supplemented one authority imbalance with another. 
Lack of Moral Self-Licensing – Gratitude Interaction 
While it would be easy to explain away the failure to demonstrate any 
interaction between the moral and gratitude primes as a product of the failures of 
both primes, this may be too simple. It should be considered whether an interaction 
between the two primes is possible under any circumstances, including a mirror 
image of previous research into each individual element? 
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Does moral self-licensing overwhelm other considerations, such as gratitude, 
when making decisions? In circumstances of moral violation, the general outcome is 
stigma and negative image (Moore et al., 2010; Baucus & Baucus, 1997; Davidson, 
Worrell & Lee, 1994). Towards stigmatised individuals, behavioural changes by 
others are overwhelmingly negative and expected (Akhigbe et al., 2005). Similarly, 
those who fail to show gratitude and act accordingly are labeled with a similar type 
of stigma. However the ramifications and social implications of these stigmas differ 
substantially. To act in defiance of gratitude displays poor manners and judgment, to 
act in defiance of morality displays darker tendencies. If we assume that stigma from 
a moral failure is greater than from a violation of gratitude, it is arguable 
consideration of the implications of moral failure stigma override other 
considerations, such as gratitude failure stigma. Following such reasoning, gratitude 
is not an adequate foil to moral self-licensing as originally hypothesised. 
However research into political convictions and responses raises questions 
about this line of argument. In research on the moral and emotional bases for public 
policy preferences, Skitka and Wisneski (2011) found that positive and negative 
emotions partially mediated the effects of prior policy convictions and resulting 
behavioural tendencies. Their findings indicated that emotions would mediate 
commitment to activism or similar pursuits of political policy activity. Therefore 
though a combined effect of morality and emotional state on behaviour is 
questionable, emotions act to moderate and arbitrate outcomes. It should be noted 
however, that gratitude made up just one of the emotions analysed in Skitka and 
Wisneski’s (2011), where emotions were categorized as positive or negative, and no 
emotion was analysed individually. Furthermore, there is a difference between moral 
convictions and moral self-licensing. Moral convictions are long associated with 
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certain emotional states, for example anger (Mullen & Skitka, 2006), as well as 
motivators for behaviour (Morgan & Skitka, 2012), where as moral self-licensing 
seeks to explain behaviours associated with maintaining a form of internal moral 
balance. Hence, while emotions may be able to sway moral conviction based 
behaviour, it does necessarily follow that the same is true of emotions and moral 
self-licensing. 
Given the relatively small body of previous research and experiments 
exploring moral self-licensing from a psychological perspective, let alone potential 
interaction with emotions, Experiment 1 broke new ground. However it did so in a 
simplified form subsequently reflected at least partially in the results obtained. 
Flaws in Situation Designs 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 1 in Experiment 1 was borrowed almost directly from Sachdeva et al. 
(2009), with few changes. However, while the results of Scenario 1 failed to find a 
significant moral self-licensing effect, Sachdeva et al. (2009) found statistically 
significant effects for both the moral credit and deficit conditions. Given that 
changes were made in the priming task, but not the wording of the scenario, one 
conclusion is that the moral self-licensing priming tool used in this experiment was 
insufficient. 
However, another interpretation of the findings is that moral self-licensing 
theory as an explanation and predictor of behaviour is less pervasive than claimed by 
Sachdeva et al. (2009). Scenario 1 utilised a hypothetical situation foreign to the 
participant population, and not readily relatable to everyday decisions or 
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circumstances participants would usually face. Whether this difference to 
experienced circumstances represents a barrier to moral self-licensing, and hence 
provides scope to how the theory may be applied, should be further considered. 
Though issues with the prime must be considered, it should not be at the expense of 
alternative explanations. Further data is required to explore this possibility. 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 2’s situation of lying to one’s parents was age-appropriate given the 
demographic composition of the participant population. However, it is arguable the 
scenario was flawed in presenting two alternatives with unequal gains and losses. 
Lying has been established as a common, everyday existence. In a 1996 study of 
various population samples, including college students, DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, 
Wyer and Epstein found participants averaged between 1 and 2 lies a day, depending 
on age and community. They also found that while interactions involving lying were 
experienced as less pleasant and more negative, they were not regarded as serious. 
Further the threat of being caught lying had little effect of plans to cease lying. 
Significant volumes of research also indicate young adults have a willingness, 
if not propensity, to lie to their parents. In a study of 229 high school students and 
261 American college students, Jensen, Arnett, Feldman and Cauffman (2004) found 
that for young adults, lying to parents may constitute an expression of the right to 
autonomy. Although high school students, broadly classed as adolescents, were more 
accepting of lying, and lied to authority figures including their parents more 
frequently, college students still lied to their parents on a range of topics, while less 
accepting of lying overall. 
	 	 MORAL	LICENSING	AND	CLEANSING	 61	
The results of Scenario 2 may provide further scope to the applicability of 
moral self-licensing theory in explaining decisions and behaviour. In circumstances 
similar to Scenario 2, where alternative decisions have unequal consequences, moral 
self-licensing is unlikely to predict behaviour. As discussed below, the results of 
Scenario 3 provide further evidence of this. 
Scenario 3 
In contrast to Scenario 2, where the lack of balance in the alternatives options 
was towards the less moral decision, Scenario 3 presented the opposite. An 
overwhelming number of participants in Scenario 3 chose not to cheat, under risk of 
discovery and expulsion. 
Various studies have identified different levels of cheating in higher education 
(Burns, Davis & Hoshino, 1998; Davis & Ludvigson, 1995; Stern & Havlicek, 
1980). However all have found that cheating is a not insubstantial problem. Indeed it 
is relatively common, including across cultural settings (Burns et al., 1998). 
Although various mechanisms have been proposed to prevent cheating, the threat of 
expulsion has been established as perhaps the most efficient. 
In a study of Japanese and South African high school and university students, 
expulsion from school was identified as the threat most likely to discourage cheating 
(Burns et al., 1998). This finding was consistent across respondents who did not 
cheat, who only cheated once or twice, and those who reported consistently cheating. 
While the value of self-reporting by regular cheaters is questionable, given most 
higher education academic institutions commonly expel students caught cheating, 
responses from occasional and non-cheaters indicates the severity of the perceived 
outcome. 
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Similarly, a study by Hall and Kuh (1998) examining attitudes towards 
cheating amongst students, academic staff and university administrators found 
expulsion was seen by all groups as a major deterrent to cheating. Students also 
indicated they would be unlikely to take action against cheating peers given the risk 
of severe punishments such as expulsion. This attitude only changed when one 
student’s cheating was seen as having a negative effect upon an individual’s own 
academic performance. 
Therefore, the results of Scenario 3 may be interpreted as providing additional 
evidence that theoretically, moral self-licensing may not offer an explanation of 
behaviour where decisions concern two unbalanced alternatives. Though the results 
of Scenarios 2 and 3 are by no means definitive, nor is this explanation the only 
possibility (see above discussion of issues with the design of the prime tool), it 
presents questions regarding the application, and interpretation, of moral self-
licensing theory. 
Absence of Risk as a Factor 
Measures of risk-taking as a predicting factor were only found to be 
statistically significant in Scenario 2, with risk failing to reach significance in 
Scenarios 1 or 3. This is notable given the issue of unbalanced alternative decisions 
in Scenario 2 discussed above. However, that explanation does not account for the 
analysis of risk. 
One possible explanation is that despite the ease with which young adults lie to 
their parents, Scenario 2 provided a semblance of balance between risk and rewards. 
In Scenario 3, it is clear that the risk posed was too great, and overly discouraged one 
behavioural option. In Scenario 1, it could be argued that risk was in fact not a 
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pertinent factor as there were equal risks to any course of action. Scenario 1 clearly 
established that whatever response was given, it was a tradeoff: either profit could be 
increased while decreasing the chance of promotion, or pollution could be decreased. 
Contrastingly in Scenario 2, though the risk of the lie being discovered is low, it still 
exists without overwhelming, or being overwhelmed by the alternative. 
A second potential interpretation of the results is that there was insufficient 
differentiation between participants’ risk scores. The degree, to which participant 
risk scores grouped around the midpoint of the scale, rather than more evenly spread 
from one end to the other, indicated a participant pool with similar risk-taking and 
interpretation. Potentially, this similarity resulted in too little statistical difference 
between risk-scores to measure for an effect. Though an effect of risk in was found 
to be statistically significant in scenario 2, the lack of significance in scenarios 1 and 
3 may be interpreted as indicating any effect was too small to be found with smaller 
participant pools and limited variation in risk scores. Further study and analysis is 
required to determine what role, if any, risk may play in moral self-licensing or 
gratitude decisions.  
“Safe” and Whole Number Anchoring 
One final feature of the results from Experiment 1 that should be addressed 
was the inclination of some participants to anchor to 60 per cent as their filtering 
level in Scenario 1. Given 60 per cent was the filtering percentage provided as an 
example to participants as that previously agreed to, this is one potential explanation 
for its prevalence. Furthermore, many participants appeared to treat the response 
scale as one with multiples of 10 as set value points, rather than any value between 0 
and 100. 
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Although the topic of “safe” number anchoring has garnered very little 
discussion in psychological literature, numerous tactics have been developed to 
accommodate it. One common approach is to recode data to account for the practice, 
although this was not appropriate or necessary for the results of Experiment 1. 
However, another explanation is worth considering. As is common practice 
within social psychological research, Scenario 1 of Experiment 1 required 
participants to express their decision and view as a single figure. By anchoring to 
whole and safe numbers, it may be an indication that participants did not have a 
definitive answer and would have preferred the option of responding with a set range 
of values i.e. 50-70. Without this option participants split the difference, with 
individual differences in opinion grouped together under “safe” mean answers. 
While anchoring to 60 may have been the result of it being presented in the 
scenario, alternative reasons for anchoring to whole numbers are important. If a 
portion of the anchoring represents an attempt to “split the difference”, and a wish to 
give answers as a data range rather than single figure, this could have major 
implications for interpretation of results. Unfortunately, there is insufficient data to 
explore this further in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 2 Introduction 
The failure to replicate previous findings and produce statistically significant 
results in Experiment 1 was the result of multiple factors, both methodological and 
theoretical. Both sets of factors provide substantial direction for Experiment 2. 
Revision of Scenarios 
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All scenarios used in Experiment 1 may be criticised on a number of points. It 
is important to address these in designing appropriate scenarios and questions for 
Experiment 2. 
Plant Manager Scenario 
Despite the theoretical considerations discussed above, which require further 
data, replication of Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) environmental management scenario still 
represents a reliable, established test of moral self-licensing. However, participant 
responses in this scenario in Experiment 1 displayed significant safe number 
anchoring, specifically to the provided filtering level examples. Though similar 
wording and provision of example percentages was used in previous studies, such as 
Sachdeva et al. (2009), and Khan & Dhar (2006), the issue cannot be ignored for 
Experiment 2. 
One alternative approach is to provide a contrast between human and financial 
cost. Such a description might read, “P per cent of emissions unfiltered equals B 
number of members of the community suffering side effects.” Further, “x per cent of 
filtered emissions will cost y per cent of profits, though x per cent of unfiltered 
emission will result z per cent of profits due to community sentiment and criticism.” 
Although such an equation does not completely mitigate the possibility of 
participants anchoring to the provided numbers, it removes the obvious option, as 
provided in Experiment 1. 
The wording in Experiment 1 also presented an example filtering level slightly 
above half the time, which, whether an individual was primed to moral credit of 
deficit, potentially provided an attractive point to anchor. In contrast, the use of an 
equation such as the above would require participants to anchor to a very low level 
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of filtering (i.e. P = 10 per cent), which is not a theoretically viable option across 
both moral prime conditions. 
Further Environmental Scenarios 
 A potential criticism of Experiment 1 was the lack of focus between scenarios. 
Given Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) scenario focuses on environmental v. monetary 
decision-making, developing scenarios with some degree of consistency in focus, for 
example the environment, may provide a better test of moral self-licensing. 
Three possibilities are questions of personal costs to address climate change, 
recycled water and acceptance of nuclear power. All issues have featured in 
Australia’s recent environmental and political discourse, and have engendered public 
discussion regarding the correct environmental direction for the country to pursue. 
The implementation of the carbon pricing mechanism by then-Prime Minister Gillard 
proved controversial, with polling demonstrating drastic divisions in public 
favourability (Tingle & Priest, 2012). Similarly a 2006 referendum in Toowoomba, 
North Queensland resulted in a 62 per cent vote against the use of recycled water 
(The Chronicle, 2011), while the West Australian public largely supported a trial of 
similar measures (Trenwith, 2012). Finally, nuclear power is a constant issue in 
Australian environmental politics, with differing levels of support across polls 
(McNair Gallup Poll, 2007; The Sydney Morning Herald, 2009). 
Interpersonal Relationships 
However, it is important this thesis considers moral self-licensing in types of 
scenarios not previously explored. One area of direction is interpersonal 
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relationships, and building on the results from Scenarios 2 and 3 from Experiment 1, 
the experience of emotions such as guilt and resentment in relationship decisions.  
Moll, de Oliveira-Souza and Eslinger (2003) have theorised a link between the 
experience of brain-behaviour interaction and our moral reasoning. Further, using 
fMRI studies Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Garrido, Bramati, Caparelli-Daquer, Paiva, 
Zahn and Grafman (2007) illustrated distinct patterns of brain activation when 
comparing “prosocial”, “empathic”, and “other-critical” emotional questions. Borg, 
Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton and Sinnott-Armstrong (2006) also found similar brain 
activity when comparing various “moral” and “nonmoral” scenarios with fMRI. 
Moll et al. (2003) also proposed a further link between moral reasoning and 
common human experiences, including religion and interpersonal relationships. They 
argued this stemed from the link between experience of brain-behaviour interaction 
and moral reasoning. This link has been described as a neural basis for humans’ 
unique moral cognition (Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Krueger & Grafman, 2005). 
During interpersonal relationships, it is common to experience a range of emotions 
that previous fMRI studies have linked to differing brain activity. Guilt, resentment, 
love and happiness are examples (Moll et al., 2007; Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton 
& Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006). As Prinz (2006) summarises, moral judgments may be 
viewed as emotional in nature. Hence, a manipulation of such emotions may alter 
subsequent moral judgment. Similarly, manipulation of moral condition may result in 
different emotions experienced in interpersonal relationships. 
Moral Self-Licensing: Single Focus 
Interpreting the results of Experiment 1, the limitations of examining moral 
self-licensing and gratitude in the same experiment were considered. Specifically, 
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whether adequate experimental materials and method, without the benefit of a true 
confederate of other additional resources as previously utilised by Bartlett and 
DeSteno (2006), could be designed to correctly prime for both moral self-licensing 
and gratitude. The results of Experiment 1 clearly demonstrated the limitations of 
utilising deceit and a faux-confederate, and it is probable that similar limitations and 
failures would be repeated should a revised prime still utilising such conditions be 
repeated. Therefore, given this thesis’ primary focus is on the emerging theory of 
moral self-licensing, not gratitude, it is more appropriate to examine this singularly, 
and exclude gratitude from Experiment 2. 
However, in order to continue to explore moral self-licensing in different 
directions, a decision-feedback tool utilising various sources of feedback may be 
included. This would provide data on both original decisions, as well as how such 
feedback interacts with, and potentially affects, subsequent moral self-licensing 
primed decisions. Using Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) production plant environmental 
management scenario, this may be achieved by splitting the scenario into two phases. 
Initially participants indicate their preferred level of filtering. They subsequently 
complete the moral prime and are provided with a form of feedback, specifically 
criticism. Following this criticism, participants are asked whether they wish to 
reconsider their previous responses. For this experiment, the criticism feedback 
would come from either the hypothetical company the participant works for, or the 
surrounding community. 
This method draws on Khan and Dhar’s (2006) research into consumer choice 
as well as Strahilevitz and Myers’ (1998) analysis of the interaction between 
charitable donations and subsequent consumption. In their work, Strahilevitz and 
Myers (1998) demonstrated that promised charitable acts, specifically donations, 
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promoted subsequent consumption of luxury items and goods, though the same effect 
was not found in the consumption of everyday items, those potentially viewed as 
necessities. 
In this proposed criticism feedback method, a participant’s reaction to 
community criticism is akin to the altruistic response of Khan and Dhar (2006) and 
the promised charitable acts donations of Strahilevitz and Myers (1998). Conversely, 
the reaction to company criticism and the pursuit of profits is likely akin to the 
hedonistic reaction of Khan and Dhar (2006). This two-phase design also has the 
added benefit of providing a within subject test of the moral prime tool. 
It should be acknowledged that the use of the two-phase design might provide 
participants the opportunity to undertake an alternative form of safe number 
anchoring: their reconsidered answers anchored to their initial responses pre-prime 
and criticism. This could potentially confound the effect of the utilised primes. 
However, such safe number anchoring would not be problematic for the purposes of 
Experiment 2 as it would provide further evidence concerning conditions that may 
limit the applicability of moral self-licensing theory as an explanation for behaviour.  
Whether community criticism could really be expected to elicit an altruistic 
response should also be considered. Arguably, the theoretically increased filtering 
due to such criticism may not reach the level of luxury consumption demonstrated in 
Strahilevitz and Myers (1998). Instead participants may interpret it as akin to daily 
necessities. However, Khan and Dhar’s (2006) research demonstrated the importance 
of the extent of giving in subsequent altruistic acts and charitable behaviour. Used as 
a guide, as long as the criticism from either source is perceived to be strong enough 
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by the participant (extent of the giving in Khan and Dhar (2006)), it can be expected 
to elicit the theorised response.  
Revision of the Priming Tool 
It is clearly important to revise the moral self-licensing prime used in 
Experiment 1. A failure of the moral prime in Experiment 1 was that it was overly 
vague, and did not specify a definitive negative of positive moral act and/or use of 
descriptors. While the prime of Reed et al. (2007) or Sachdeva et al. (2009) may be 
appropriated, it is worth considering a further modified version, as this potentially 
provides increased scope to consider the conditions required for moral self-licensing.  
One option is to ask participants to consider a specific, recent good or bad deed 
they have performed and how this affected others. Participants would then write a 
short piece detailing this deed, the effects it had on others, and how the participant 
feels about this now. The design addresses the over-simplification of the prime in 
Experiment 1, while also providing a greater focus on the positive and negative 
moral conditions. 
Measure of Risk 
Presenting an appropriate picture of propensity for risk-taking is important. 
Weber et al.’s (2002) Domain-Specific Risk-Attitude Scale provided an age-
appropriate measure for participants who were university students. However this is 
inappropriate for a participant pool with greater variation in age. An alternative is to 
utilise Blais and Weber’s (2006) revised Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale. The 
revised scale adopts questions applicable across a wider age range. Additionally, it 
reduces the overall number of items from 40 to 30. 
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Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 aimed to test for moral self-licensing, the effects of criticism 
feedback, and joint moral self-licensing-criticism effects. Further, Experiment 2 
explored moral self-licensing theory in interpersonal relationship situations. 
Experiment 2 also aimed to examine the relationship between risk-taking and moral 
self-licensing behaviour. Changes and alterations to materials and method were made 
to reflect deficiencies and considerations following Experiment 1. 
Experiment 2 utilised a similar design to Experiment 1, with a number of 
important alterations. A scenario based on Sachdeva et al. (2009), and included in 
Experiment 1, was once again used, however it was altered to include pre and post 
moral prime questions, as well as the above discussed criticism feedback. The moral 
prime was also revised, as discussed above. A variety of other scenarios that focus on 
environmental issues, a continuation of one theme of the Sachdeva et al. (2009) 
scenario, were also included. Finally, an interpersonal relationship themed scenario 
was used. Risk-taking was controlled for through the use of Blais and Weber’s 
(2006) revised Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale. 
This thesis hypothesised that participants under the moral credit condition 
would exhibit greater morally negative behaviour while those in the moral deficit 
condition would exhibit greater morally positive behaviour. It was also hypothesised 
that the criticism conditions would interact with the moral self-licensing conditions: 
company criticism would increase morally ambiguous or immoral behaviour while 
community criticism would increase morally positive behaviour. Furthermore, it was 
hypothesised that participants in the moral deficit condition may display more 
prosocial interpersonal relationship behaviour, and vice versa. 
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The relationship between risk-taking and moral self-licensing was also 
examined. Higher risk-taking scores were predicted to be related to increased moral 
licensing behaviour. 
Experiment 2 Method 
Participants 
Experiment 2 had 115 participants (48 males, 67 females), with an age range of 
18 to 59, and a mean of 23.45 (SD = 6.14). Participants included both undergraduate 
students, and members of the wider public. Australian National University students 
enrolled in first year psychology were eligible for 1-hour course credit. 
Design 
Experiment 2 utilised a 2 (moral credit v. moral deficit prime) x 2 (company 
criticism v. community criticism) x 2 (original negotiation v. renegotiation) 
experimental design. 
Materials 
Participants in Experiment 2 undertook a questionnaire made up of 3 question 
sections. 
Participants were initially presented with a refined version of the 
manufacturing plant manager hypothesis used in Experiment 1, itself based upon the 
work of Sachdeva et al. (2009). In this version of the hypothetical, participants were 
informed that for every 10% of unfiltered release, 1000 people in the community 
would suffer side effects. Participants were also informed that every 10% of filtration 
would cost the company 3% in profits, however, every 10% not filtered would result 
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in a 2% loss of profits due to negative publicity. Participants were also offered a 
$250 salary increase for every 1% of filtration prevented. 
Participants were questioned on how much they would agree to filter, how 
much they believed a manager at a rival company would agree to filter, and how 
much they believed another manager at the same company would agree to filter. The 
use of both another manager at the same company and a manager at a rival company 
was an attempt to control for a potential the Wilder or Bradley Effect in participants 
responses given the socially unacceptable nature for certain decision options 
(Hopkins, 2009; Stout & Kline, 2008). 
Participants were subsequently primed using a tool based on Sachdeva et al. 
(2009), similar to that used in Experiment 1. However, in this instance the prime 
questioned a specific good or bad deed rather than general positive or negative 
personality traits. 
Participants were then informed that their previous decision had come under 
criticism from either the company or community. In light of the criticism, 
participants were asked whether they would seek to re-negotiate their position, and 
were then re-presented with the previous questions. Participants were also questioned 
whether they believed another manager at their company and a manager at a rival 
company would seek to renegotiate their position and if so, to what level. 
In the second set of questions, participants were presented with three 
hypothetical scenarios concerning various environmental and community issues: 
those of a carbon price, recycled water and nuclear power. The carbon price 
hypothetical is presented as an example in Table 4. 
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The final hypothetical scenario was a situation involving their current romantic 
partner and a choice between a once in a lifetime opportunity to meet a childhood 
hero or undertake a trip their partner had been planning for some time. Questions 
enquired as to feelings of resentment and guilt related to the alternative choices. 
Finally, participants were asked a series of demographic questions, as well as 
Blais and Weber’s (2006) revised Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale. The updated 
2006 scale was used in Experiment 2 given wider demographic applicability. A 
complete copy of the Experiment 2 materials is attached as Appendix B. 
Procedure 
Table 4 
Example of moral choice paradigm: carbon price 
 
The Australian Federal Government has recently announced the details of its Carbon 
Pricing scheme, in order to reduce Australia’s carbon emissions. Under this plan 
consumers will not be taxed, instead 500 of Australia largest polluting companies will 
pay for their emissions. 
 
However, suppose hypothetically that the carbon tax was to also be imposed upon 
individuals. 
 
1. Using a range of 1-10% of your personal, pre-tax income, please indicate how much 
you would be willing to pay to do your part under such a hypothetical tax. Please note 
this amount would be in addition to standard income tax. 
 
2. Do you believe that there has been human induced climate change? Y/N 
 
3. Do you believe that action needs to be taken in order to either counter, or mitigate 
climate change? Y/N 	
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Experiment 2 was presented using the Qualtrecs online survey tool, enabling 
participants to access the study from a venue of their choice. Consent was first 
obtained, following which a brief passage of text explained the basic purpose of the 
study. Participants then made their way through the questions strands. Both the moral 
prime, and the company v. community criticism variable were randomly assigned by 
the Qualtrecs software, which was programmed to randomly assign using a 1:1 
overall ratio. 
Following completion of the study, participants were provided with a 
debriefing document explaining the aims and hypotheses of the research, as well as 
experimenter and ethics office contact information. 
Experiment 2 Results 
Data Screening and Cleaning 
Data screening and cleaning, as well as subsequent analysis was performed 
using IBM SPSS Statistics 20 for Mac. Dependent variables were assessed for 
measures of skew and kurtosis. Data from the first scenario, before and after priming, 
indicated slight positive to slight negative skew, and slight positive to moderately 
negative kurtosis. Similar results for found for the following 4 scenarios, with slight 
negative to positive skew, and slight negative to positive kurtosis. Both 
transformation and recoding of data proved inappropriate. Box-plots revealed no 
significant univariate outliers were found, whilst Mahalanobis distance evaluation 
showed no multivariate outliers. 
Two participants had failed to complete the majority of the experiment, and 
were excluded from subsequent analysis, while a further 3 were excluded for failure 
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to complete the moral prime. Missing values analysis revealed other missing values 
were spread randomly throughout the data, and accounted for less than 2% of 
responses. The “exclude cases pairwise option” was therefore selected for 
subsequent SPSS analysis. Missing values analysis also revealed a number of 
missing values in Blais and Weber’s (2006) Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale, 
including 8 participants who failed to complete the scale. For the other participants 
with missing values, the missing data accounted for less than 2% on the total scale 
items. Descriptive statistical analysis both including and excluding each participant 
revealed similar means and standard deviations. Cases were therefore included, with 
mean substitution used for missing values. 
Initial Descriptive Analysis 
Primary descriptive statistics examination revealed mixed results. Mean 
filtering levels were found to be lower in the moral credit prime condition compared 
to the moral deficit prime condition across the yourefilter, rivalrefilter and 
otherrefilter questions. Similarly, mean filtering was lower across the same questions 
in the company criticism condition compared to the community criticism condition. 
Across all four conditions, rivalrefilter demonstrated the lowest filtering level. 
Means were also inspected for evidence of a possible interaction between the 
moral self-licensing and criticism primes. As can be seen in Table 5, difference in 
mean filtering between the moral credit and deficit primes, across the three 
questions, was most marked in the community criticism condition. In contrast, in the 
company criticism conditions, means were more similar across the two moral prime 
conditions. 
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Line graphs were subsequently used to further examine the interaction pattern 
across the three refiltering questions. As can be clearly seen in Figures 1, 2 and 3, 
differences between filtering percentages in the moral credit and deficit prime 
conditions are only apparent in the community criticism condition. In the company 
Table 5 
Difference in Mean Filtering Percentage for Refilter Questions in Moral Self-
Licensing Prime by Criticism Prime Interaction 
Filter 
Dependent 
Variable 
Prime 
Condition 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Overall Mean 
  Company 
Criticism 
Community 
Criticism 
 
yourefilter Moral Credit 
Prime 
50.40 (28.26) 43.00 (23.62) 48.38 
 Moral Deficit 
Prime 
46.00 (28.22) 57.76 (26.22) 54.98 
 Overall Mean 49.32 53.88  
   
Company 
Criticism 
 
Community 
Criticism 
 
rivalrefilter Moral Credit 
Prime 
39.95 (24.02) 29.33 (17.15) 37.05 
 Moral Deficit 
Prime 
42.62 (24.47) 50.24 (23.01) 48.41 
 Overall Mean 40.60 44.64  
   
Company 
Criticism 
 
Community 
Criticism 
 
otherrefilter Moral Credit 
Prime 
46.03 (26.35) 32.33 (17.31) 42.29 
 Moral Deficit 
Prime 
42.54 (23.75) 51.12 (24.71) 49.09 
 Overall Mean 45.17 46.18  	
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criticism condition, this difference is smaller, with the moral prime condition effect 
smaller. 
Figure 1. Difference in yourefilter mean filtering percentage between moral credit and deficit 
prime conditions, and company and community criticism conditions.   
                             
Figure 2. Different in rivalrefilter mean filtering percentage between moral credit and deficit 
prime conditions, and company and community criticism conditions. 
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Figure 3. Difference in otherrefilter mean filtering percentage between moral credit and deficit 
prime conditions, and company and community criticism conditions.  
 
Descriptive statistics were also used to examine the frequency of renegotiation 
in Scenario 1. As Table 6 shows, participants in the moral credit condition had a 
higher frequency of renegotiation across all refilter questions compared to 
participants in the moral deficit condition. Similar statistics also revealed participants 
in the company criticism condition had a higher frequency of renegotiating across all 
refilter questions compared to the community criticism condition, as shown in Table 
7. 
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Means were also inspected for data from the climate change, recycled water, 
nuclear energy and relationship scenarios. In the climate change scenario there was 
Table 6 
Difference in Renegotiation Frequency (as percentage) for Refilter Questions in 
Moral Self-Licensing Prime Conditions 
Filter Dependent Variable Renegotiate Not-renegotiate 
 Moral Credit Prime Condition  
yourefilter 63.63 36.37 
rivalrefilter 58.18 41.81 
otherrefilter 69.09 30.91 
 Moral Deficit Prime Condition  
yourefilter 58.18 41.81 
rivalrefilter 47.27 52.73 
otherrefilter 58.18 41.81 
	Table	7	
Difference	in	Renegotiation	Frequency	(as	percentage)	for	Refilter	Questions	in	
Criticism	Condition	Filter	Dependent	Variable	 Renegotiate	 Not-renegotiate		 Company	Criticism	 	yourefilter	 66.04	 33.96	rivalrefilter	 56.60	 43.40	otherrefilter	 67.92	 32.08		 Community	Criticism	 	yourefilter	 56.14	 43.86	rivalrefilter	 49.12	 50.88	otherrefilter	 59.65	 40.35		
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little difference in the percentage of tax participants were willing to pay to combat 
climate change between the moral credit and deficit prime conditions, illustrated in 
Table 8. Participants overwhelmingly believed in climate change and government 
action to address it, with too little difference to analyse the effect of the prime. 
Both the recycled water and nuclear energy scenarios generated similar 
descriptive statistics to the climate change scenario. In both, there was little 
difference in mean acceptance of either recycled water or nuclear energy between 
prime conditions. This is shown in Table 9. 
Table 8 
Difference in Mean Additional Tax Paid (in percentage) to Address Climate Change 
in Moral Self-Licensing Prime Conditions 
Prime Condition Mean Standard Deviation 
Moral Credit 2.46 2.05 
Moral Deficit 2.48 2.29 	
Table 9 
Difference in Mean Acceptance of Recycled Water and Nuclear Energy in Moral Self-
Licensing Prime Conditions 
Prime Condition Mean Standard Deviation 
 Acceptance Recycled Water  
Moral Credit 4.92 1.34 
Moral Deficit 4.66 1.85 
 Acceptance Nuclear Energy  
Moral Credit 3.48 1.69 
Moral Deficit 3.40 1.78 
Note. Results indicate mean of participant’s answers given utilising seven point Likert scale where 1 = 
extremely unwilling, 4 = neutral, 7 = extremely willing. 
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In the relationship scenario, there was some difference between the moral 
credit and deficit primed participants in mean guilt felt if they pursued their activity 
(meet childhood hero) as opposed to their partner’s activity (took a trip), but little 
difference in mean resentfulness where they undertook their partner’s activity rather 
than their own. These results are shown in Table 10. Regardless of moral prime, 
participants indicated both communications and compromise were very important to 
a successful relationship. 
 
Univariate and Repeated Measures 
Data was subsequently analysed using repeated measures ANOVA to test 
significance of moral self-licensing prime and criticism prime conditions. The 3x2 
repeated measures ANOVA was set up with factor1 = which filter (i.e. you, rival, 
other) and factor2 = the prime (i.e. pre and post prime). Both the moral and criticism 
primes were included as between-subjects variables. 
Table 10 
Difference in Mean Guilt and Resentfulness in Moral Self-Licensing Prime Conditions 
Prime Condition Mean Standard Deviation 
 Guilt  
Moral Credit 2.98 1.70 
Moral Deficit 3.24 1.79 
 Resentfulness  
Moral Credit 3.71 1.88 
Moral Deficit 3.82 1.55 
Note. Results indicate mean of participant’s answers given utilising seven point Likert scale where 1 = 
extremely guilty/resentful, 4 = neutral, 7 = extremely non-guilty/non-resentful. 
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ANOVA analysis revealed mixed results. The interaction effect of the moral 
prime and factor2 reached significant, with F(1,105) = 6.14, p = 0.015. However, the 
interaction effect of the criticism prime and factor2 failed to reach significance, 
F(1,105) = 0.29, p = 0.589, as did the interaction between the moral prime, criticism 
prime and factor2, F(1,105) = 0.78, p = 0.379. Analysis of within-subjects effect of 
risk taking failed to reach significance. 
ANOVA results also indicated a number of interaction effects had borderline 
p-values, only slightly above the accepted cut-off for significance. The interaction 
effect between factor1 and factor2 was F(2,104) = 2.71, p = 0.071, while the 3-way 
interaction between factor1, factor2 and the criticism prime was F(2,104) = 3.07, p = 
0.051. This 3-way interaction effect is especially close to significance, important to 
note given the limited sample size. 
Repeated measures ANOVA results also revealed that the effect of the 
interaction between the moral self-licensing and criticism primes reached 
significance when tested for between-subjects effects. In this case, F(1,105) = 4.11, p 
= 0.045. Neither the moral nor criticism primes recorded significant main effects. 
Simple Effects Analysis 
Simple effects analysis was performed to further explore the significant within-
subjects interaction effect of the moral prime and factor2, and the between-subjects 
effect of the interaction between the moral and criticism primes. The simple effects 
analysis was performed using ANOVA and splitting the data set. 
Splitting the data file by moral self-licensing prime condition (i.e. separate 
moral deficit and moral credit data sets) revealed mixed results. While the interaction 
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effect of factor2 and the moral self-licensing prime was significant in the moral 
deficit condition, F(1,52) = 8.65, p = 0.005, it was not significant in the moral credit 
condition, F(1,53) = 0.52, p =0 .473. 
Simple effects analysis of the between-subjects interaction effect of the moral 
and criticism primes revealed mixed results. The data set was split by criticism 
condition, and in line with the pattern demonstrated in Figures 1, 2 and 3, the 
interaction effect between the moral prime and the community criticism condition 
was significant, F(1,54) = 6.72, p = 0.012. However, no significant effect was found 
between the moral prime and the company criticism condition, F(1,51) = 0.18, p = 
0.673. 
Similar analysis was also performed with the data file split by moral self-
licensing prime condition. Both the interaction between moral deficit prime and 
criticism, and moral credit prime and criticism failed to reach significance. 
Experiment 2 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 provided mixed support for the experimental 
hypotheses. Firstly, a significant effect of the moral prime on participant behavior 
was found: those primed using a moral credit tool would display increased immoral 
behaviour as opposed to those primes using a moral deficit tool. In scenarios akin to 
those utilised by Sachdeva et al. (2009), the moral prime was found to affect the 
level of filtering undertaken by participants. While analysis found an overall effect, 
simple effects analysis indicated mixed support. The moral deficit prime 
significantly affected the behaviour and choices of participants, however the moral 
credit prime failed to reach significance, although it did show the predicted mean 
difference. Therefore, results from Experiment 2 partially conflict with previously 
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discussed studies by Sachdeva et al. (2009), Effron et al., (2009) and Monin and 
Miller (2001).  
Similarly mixed support was found for the hypothesised interaction between 
the moral and criticism primes: that company criticism would elicit further morally 
ambiguous or immoral behaviour, and community criticism would increase morally 
positive behaviour. While initial analysis revealed a statistically significant 
interaction effect between the moral and criticism primes, further simple effects 
analysis revealed mixed results. Splitting the data set by the criticism condition, a 
significant difference was found between the moral primes in the community 
criticism condition, but no significant difference was found between the moral 
primes in the company criticism condition. 
This result partially conflicts with Khan and Dhar’s (2006) work on consumer 
choice activation and subsequent self-attributions in the consumption of luxury or 
hedonistic goods, as well as Strahilevitz and Myers’ (1998) findings regarding 
charitable activity and consumption of luxury against necessary items. However, as 
previously forecast, these findings may be explained by an alternative theoretical 
application of previous studies, as well as issues surrounding sample size and 
statistical power, which are discussed in greater detail below. 
No support was found for the hypothesised effect that the moral prime would 
lead to increased morally positive or negative behaviour, depending on prime 
condition, in the various environmental scenarios, nor the interpersonal relationship 
based scenario. This does not conflict with Moll et al.’s (2003) proposed moral 
reasoning and human experiences link, but may assist in further exploring the 
proposal, as discussed below. 
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Finally, no support was found for increased moral licensing behaviour due to 
risk-taking propensity. It should be noted that, similarly to Experiment 1, there was a 
limited variance in participants’ Blais and Weber (2006) risk-taking scores, which 
provided only limited scope for statistical analysis of possible effects of risk-taking 
propensity on behaviour.  
Comparison of Effect Sizes 
Given mixed support for the hypotheses, and differing effect sizes found in 
Experiment 2, it is worth comparing the effect sizes to previous research on moral 
self-licensing. Such comparison will highlight findings in this Experiment 2 that 
sharply contrast with previous results, as well as areas of similar data and effect 
sizes. 
Experiment 3 in Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) paper provided the nearest “like-for-
like” comparison with the manufacturing plant manager scenario from Experiment 2. 
Sachdeva et al. (2009) found significant effects in both the moral credit and deficit 
conditions. Asking participants what percentage they would filter pollution, with a 
hypothetical agreed rate of 60%, they found a mean of 73% for moral deficit 
participants, and 55.6% for moral credit participants, while results of what 
percentage another manager would filter did not reach significance. In contrast, 
Experiment 2 of this thesis found a filtering mean of 48.38% in the moral credit 
condition, and 54.98 in the moral deficit condition. 
However a better comparison is of effect sizes using R2. To determine R2 
values, reported f-statistic scores were converted using the tool produced by 
Smithson (2000). In their moral credit condition, Sachdeva et al. (2009) reported F 
(2,43) = 3.59, R2 = 0.14, compared to F(1,53) = 0.522, R2 = 0.01 in Experiment 2 of 
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this thesis, which failed to reach significance. While Sachdeva et al. (2009) did not 
report the relevant F-statistic for their moral deficit condition, if a similar result to 
that obtained in the moral credit condition is assumed, this can be compared to the 
moral deficit results obtained in Experiment 2, F(1,52) = 8.646, R2 = 0.14. Hence, in 
the moral credit condition, Sachdeva et al. (2009) found a larger effect size, though 
the effect size of moral deficit in Experiment 2 is similar to the reported moral credit 
effect size in Sachdeva et al. (2009).   
A further comparison, though not “like-for-like”, is with Experiment 2 from 
Monin and Miller’s (2001) paper exploring moral self-licensing in the expression of 
prejudice. In their experiment, the only condition was moral credit, with no 
equivalent to the moral deficit condition used in this thesis. Monin and Miller (2001) 
found F(1,124) = 6.3, R2 = 0.048 when measuring the effect size of the moral 
licensing behaviour in expression of prejudice. This is larger than the effect size of 
moral deficit in Experiment 2. Though obviously the two experiments examined 
moral self-licensing under different circumstances and using substantially different 
methods, comparison of the results provides further notable contrast with this thesis’ 
findings, which failed to reach significance in the moral credit condition. 
Though other comparisons with previous studies are possible, the above 
reflected both the most similar experiments, in the case of Sachdeva et al. (2009), as 
well as a further example where experimental design allowed for such a comparison. 
Though further comparisons are possible, the above provides the necessary snapshot. 
A(nother) Question of Moral Self-licensing Priming 
While more effective than that used in Experiment 1, the mixed results of 
Experiment 2 raised further questions regarding the revised moral self-licensing 
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priming tool. These questions are also raised by the contrast demonstrated above 
between effect sizes from Experiment 2, and previous studies such as Sachdeva et al. 
(2009). Given the refinements made to the moral prime tool between Experiments 1 
and 2, and the subsequent difference in results, a number of facets of the moral self-
licensing prime, and the theory behind its operation bear further consideration. 
Deficit v Credit 
A major query regards the failure of the moral credit prime effect to reach 
significance, compared to the significant effect of the moral deficit prime. While the 
Repeated Measures ANOVA indicated a significant overall effect for the moral self-
licensing prime in Scenario 1, simple effects analysis demonstrated significance only 
in the moral deficit condition. Why the difference? Both primes were worded almost 
identically, only differing in defining the past deed i.e. good v. bad etc. 
One possibility lies in participants’ interpretation of the primes, and the nature 
of the deed they were being asked to recall. In the moral deficit condition, 
participants had to recall and describe a selfish act or bad deed, while those in moral 
credit had to recall and describe an unselfish act or good deed. Though there was 
significant variation in the deeds and acts described by participants, including in how 
“everyday” compared to “out of the ordinary” they were, self-described unselfish 
acts or good deeds tended to be actions many people undertake on a regular basis. 
These were acts most be people would do with little thought, and in many cases form 
part of social convention for good behaviour. 
In contrast, self-described selfish acts or bad deeds tended to be more negative. 
Even where they could be thought of as common mistakes, the negative 
characteristics of the acts or deeds stood out, compared to the commonality of the 
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positive or unselfish equivalents. In their choice of examples in the prime, 
participants tended towards interpreting the recall of past negative actions as more 
serious and with greater implications at the time, compared to the recall of prior good 
deeds or undertakings. 
Therefore the mixed results may stem from a different interpretation of the 
primes, and subsequent importance placed by the participants on the events or deeds 
recalled. While those in the moral deficit prime appeared to describe more important 
and less common/everyday events, perhaps event acts or deeds which illicit 
memories laced with shame, moral deficit prime participants utilised more benign 
positive deeds. The difference in importance attached by participants to the different 
acts and deeds was subsequently responsible for the difference in importance place 
upon the prime itself. Where the deed was considered more serious, as was more 
likely the case for moral deficit prime participants in Experiment 2, the prime was 
more likely to have the intended effect, with a significant effect on 
choices/behaviour. Where it was considered less serious or more everyday, which 
was more common with moral credit condition responses, the prime did not have the 
intended effect. 
It is also possible that reduced statistical power, brought about by splitting the 
data set to allow for simple effects analysis, played some role in the failure to reach 
significance. However this explanation is flawed. Tests for the effect of the moral 
deficit prime also utilised the same reduced statistical power, and it reached 
significance. Hence, while it may have played a role in failure to find a significant 
effect in the moral credit condition, it does not account for the difference between 
conditions. 
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Assigning Characteristics 
The lack of significant effects in the moral credit condition, compared to the 
moral deficit condition, highlighted a key feature of individuals’ assignment of 
positive and negative characteristics to themselves and others. Sachdeva et al. (2009) 
found individuals have a tendency to assign positive traits, characteristics and 
descriptors to themselves, while assigning negative traits, characteristic and 
descriptors to others. This tendency is partially controlled by the moral prime itself. 
However it may be hypothesised that by forcing participants to use negative 
descriptors, and discuss negative traits or acts about themselves, as opposed to 
others, the impact of the prime was increased: that the everyday assignment of 
positive traits to oneself decreases the actual impact of such an attribution compared 
to the contrasting negative traits and descriptors. 
Prime v Manufacturing Plant Manager Scenario 
Another factor to consider regarding the lack of significant effects in the moral 
credit condition was the clarity of the relationship between the prime condition, 
credit or deficit, and the scenario action. In the manufacturing plant scenario, which 
action is morally positive and which morally negative, filtering against profit, may be 
interpreted in different ways. As results from Experiment 2, as well as Sachdeva et 
al.’s (2009) previous work, confirmed, increased filtering and hence decreased health 
risks in the hypothetical community is clearly seen as the morally positive response. 
However the alternate course of action, not filtering and increasing profits, is 
arguably not as clearly defined in a moral sense. Specifically, not increasing the 
filtering level is a failure to take action. It is not an action, but instead a lack of 
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action. While moral self-licensing theory proposed a behavioural link between a 
subconscious moral state and our actions, is the effect as strong for non-action? 
Prime Effect and Accessibility of Scenario 
Given the differences discussed above between the effect sizes found by 
Sachdeva et al. (2009) and the results of Experiment 2 it is worth considering what 
effect, if any, the accessibility of the hypothetical scenario had on the effectiveness 
of the prime? Given the consistent findings from previous studies on moral self-
licensing which, bar Sachdeva et al. (2009), utilises common financial scenarios 
(Effron et al., 2009; Strahilevitz & Myers,1998; Monin & Miller, 2001), it is 
arguable the accessibility of the scenario is important in testing and measuring for a 
prime effect. In short, moral self-licensing theory is most apparent, and readily 
tested/manipulated, in scenarios similar to real-life circumstances, where participant's 
memories of such circumstances and prior actions are readily accessible. 
While examining moral self-licensing under economic circumstances, 
specifically consumer choice, Khan and Dhar (2006) make the point that such 
economic decision are real choices, and individuals may access previous decisions 
they have made in order to influence subsequent behaviour. The financial aspect of 
the decisions is merely an easily utilised, accessible tool. Similarly, in refining their 
experimental method and tools to examine moral self-licensing in consumption and 
charitable giving, Strahilevitz and Myers (1998) specifically referenced the 
importance of “real-world context” (pg. 441). Providing real-world/life context, and 
easily accessible scenarios, allowed participants to make realistic decisions and 
follow their actual behavioural patterns. Conversely, purely hypothetical scenarios 
with little basis or similarity to a participant’s previous experiences only allows for 
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purely hypothetical decisions, which may bear little resemblance to decisions made 
in real-life. 
Turning specifically to Scenario 1 in Experiment 2, the accessibility of the 
scenario to residents of Canberra, and students from the Australian National 
University, who largely made up the participant pool, should be considered. This is 
in contrast to students at Northwestern University in Illinois, the participants in 
Sachdeva et al.’s (2009) study. One theory is that there was a difference in 
accessibility of the scenario between the two groups. Manufacturing, and 
manufacturing plants, have long formed an integral part of the community identity of 
the American rust belt, including Illinois, and remain important despite the decades 
long decline in traditional manufacturing in these areas. As Dobbie (2008) argues, 
these traditional, working class notions of employment and labour, in this case 
manufacturing, continue to form integral parts of individual and community identity 
in many areas of the United States, including Illinois. Indeed, manufacturing in a 
community’s conscious extends beyond the working class. In contrast, 
manufacturing does not form a similar part of the identity of Canberra. It should be 
noted however that such a difference is merely theoretical and cannot be tested with 
data available to the author. 
Criticism, its Source and Effect 
The statistically significant effect found for the criticism condition, and its 
effect on moral licensing and cleansing, supported this thesis’ hypotheses. However 
the source of the criticism played a clear role in the strength of the effect. Criticism 
from the community had a significant effect on a participant’s subsequent moral 
licensing or cleansing, however criticism stemming from the company did not. 
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Hence the experimental hypotheses found mixed support. This raised the question of 
why the difference between sources of criticism? Notably both criticisms were 
presented in the same fashion, with similar wordings, and were randomly assigned to 
participants to ensure similar participants numbers in the 4 possible combinations of 
moral prime and criticism conditions. 
One theoretical explanation lies in the substance and content of the alternative 
criticisms, and how participants interpreted the importance of this. In Experiment 2, 
community sourced criticism addressed serious health related side effects in the local 
community, stemming from the action of the manufacturing plant the participants 
worked for. In contrast company criticism discussed profits for the company. 
Participants possible interpreted and placed different values on the content of the two 
criticisms, health and money, which subsequently affected their decision-making. 
Support for this explanation can be drawn from prior work by Strahilevitz and 
Myers (1998) and Khan and Dhar (2006). As previously discussed Strahilevitz and 
Myers’ (1998) work illustrated that charitable acts, equivalent to the altruism v. 
hedonism of Khan and Dhar (2006), had no significant effect on the consumption of 
everyday necessities, only luxury commodities. Necessary items were viewed as too 
important to individuals, which negated any effect on consumption post charity. 
Extended to the different effect of company and community criticism, as discussed in 
the introduction to Experiment 2, the implicit hypothesis of this explanation is that 
the profit motive of company criticism implies hedonism and luxury consumption. In 
contrast the community criticism envisages increased filtering in an altruistic and 
necessary act for the benefit of the community at large.  
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Participants judged health as a necessity, in comparison to company profit, 
leading to the statistically significant effect of the community criticism conditions. It 
is important to note however that this argument inverts the cause-effect direction as 
established by previous research. While their findings addressed attempts to 
manipulate consumptions of necessities and luxuries, this reasoning places the 
necessities at what is causing the manipulation. 
However a number of questions stem from this theory. While health and 
wellbeing are obviously important at an individual level, profit has a similar 
importance for corporations. But participants clearly treated the two as different. 
This implies that the participants did not see the two criticisms as equal though 
different concerns, leaving aside the community v corporation dynamic, but instead 
placed different values on the criticisms. Another potential contributing factor was 
that participants ignored the experimental materials, which outlined the importance 
of the profits. Unfortunately Experiment 2 did not gather relevant views regarding 
human and corporate necessities, or other opinions that may have provided insight 
into the results.  
An alternative explanation for the different criticism results is that the 
experimental materials actually provided too little difference between the two 
alternatives. While the company criticism condition directly addressed company 
profits, the community criticism condition also included threats to profits, given the 
already established decrease in business due to decreases in filtering. Although the 
use of threats to profits as a consequence of health impacts was important given it 
provided a measurable and quantifiable threat to the company, in contrast to health 
effects which are harder to quantify, it is also possible that it served to balance, or 
negate, the threat of profits in the company criticism. Essentially, participants in the 
	 	 MORAL	LICENSING	AND	CLEANSING	 95	
company criticism condition were confronted with a hypothetical scenario where 
reacting to the criticism would still impact profits. In contrast, participants in the 
community criticism condition did not have this conflict, rather only addressing 
health concerns. 
A final consideration is whether such a criticism feedback tool requires an 
additional response stage in the scenario? If we assume that community v company 
criticism is representative of altruism v hedonism, then the charitable consumption 
results of Strahilevitz and Myers (1998) indicated an initial altruistic action would be 
followed by an increased hedonistic choice. In the manufacturing plant scenario, 
while community criticism may result in an initial increase in filtering, a further 
response stage would be required to test for the expected subsequent reverse, the 
equivalent of the luxury consumption following charitable giving/action seen in 
Strahilevitz and Myers (1998). Obviously, this argument relies upon a number of 
assumptions, and should such assumptions be proved incorrect the point is moot. 
Further Absence of Risk 
The Blais and Weber (2006) measures of risk-taking were not found to be 
statistically significant predictors of moral self-licensing behaviour, contrary to the 
hypotheses of Experiment 2. Notably, the range and variability amongst the 
participant population’s risk scores was limited. The vast majority of participant’s 
risk scores, both in risk-taking and risk perception, were close to an average rating. 
This second failure to find statistically significant effects for risk raised the 
question of its relevance to moral self-licensing theory. As argued earlier in this 
thesis, given individuals often seek to avoid negative judgments and impressions 
amongst peers, theoretically an individual’s propensity for risk-taking may moderate 
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decision-making in situations where moral alternatives have the potential to lead to 
such judgments or impressions. However, despite changes to the risk-taking measure 
and experiment design following Experiment 1, Experiment 2 again failed to identify 
risk. Is risk therefore not theoretically relevant to discussions of moral self-licensing? 
While there is insufficient evidence from this thesis alone to draw such a conclusion, 
the relevance of risk to the scenarios of Experiment 2 is clearer. 
While the theoretical justification for risk as a moderator lay with public 
perception and judgment, many of the scenarios presented to test for moral licensing 
and cleansing behaviour were more private than public. Except for the plant manager 
scenario, Experiment 2’s scenarios were more private decisions, free from 
necessarily exposing oneself to negative judgments from peers, and therefore 
arguably free from the role of risk. However, such an explanation does not account 
for the failure for risk to moderate the plant manager scenario. 
A further consideration regarding the lack of statistically significant effect is 
whether the low variability of participant risk-taking scores attenuated any possible 
relationship or effect with moral licensing or cleansing? Except for 6 participants, all 
had a mean risk-taking score in the 3s or 4s, on a scale ranging from 1 to 7. Hence 
the vast majority of participants had an average or moderate risk-taking score 
according to Blais and Weber (2006), with insufficient scores indicating either low 
or high risk-taking to undertake meaningful analysis. In line with the hypothesis, it is 
therefore possible that such a relationship or effect is present but insufficient data is 
available to identify and analyse it.  
The lack of effects of the Blais and Weber (2006) risk perception score must 
also be addressed. While participants’ risk-perception scores had slightly greater 
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variation than risk-taking scores, it was again limited, with only 21 participants risk-
perception means above or below the 3s or 4s on the 1 to 7 scale. There was also a 
statistically significant negative correlation between individual’s risk perception 
scores and their risk-taking scores (r = - 0.491, n = 102, p < 0.05). While the 
correlation is as expected, the lack of variation is the primary issue, and accounted 
for the lack of statistically significant effect with either risk score. 
As with Experiment 1, it should also be considered that across a number of the 
examined scenarios, all participants displayed little difference in their choices 
irrespective of risk-taking scores, moral prime or any other variable. This is most 
apparent in the childhood hero – interpersonal relationship scenario, where 
participants uniformly indicated a strong belief in the importance of communication 
and compromise to relationships. Similar uniformity was found regarding belief in 
climate change, and to a lesser extent willingness to drink recycled water. Where 
such beliefs are held irrespective of risk-taking or perception scores, it negates the 
potential to test for the effect of risk. 
Finally, it is important to address the variation in risk-taking and risk 
perception due to gender. As has been well establish across multiple studies (see 
Byrnes, Miller and Schafer, 1999), males have a greater propensity for risk-taking 
than females. In Experiment 2, the participant population was approximately 58 per 
cent female, with risk-taking scores indicating almost uniform moderate risk-taking. 
However effects analysis controlling for gender revealed no statistically significant 
difference between male and female participants. 
Hence the type of risk, and its implications, should be considered. Byrnes et al. 
(1999) outlined that the type of risk is a factor in the extent of gender difference. 
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Using their criteria the scenarios in Experiment 2 largely fall within the choice 
dilemma category, which was argued to lead to less gender-based risk differences 
than others. Given these findings and theoretical consideration, whether risk as a 
moderating variable should be included in future moral self-licensing study remains 
questionable. 
A Word on Scenario Considerations and Limitations 
Despite the previously discussed implications of the results of Experiment 1, as 
well as previous research findings, the data and findings from Experiment 2 raised 
certain limitations in the design of the scenarios utilised. 
Morality and Issue Concern 
Substantial volumes of previous research highlighted the role morality played 
increasing attachment and engagement with issues, including the importance 
attached to certain causes. Across multiple fields and facets, from political, religious, 
social and others, a moral connection or concern has been found to be an important 
element in guiding an individual’s involvement (Stern, 2000; Bratt, 1999; Stern, 
Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, and Kalof, 1999; and Cable, Walsh, and Warland, 1988). 
This role of morality is not confined to what may be termed activism, which implies 
a level of commitment and devotion of time and resources, but also more generally 
in those issues people devote at least some resources to. Sachdeva et al. (2009) 
further suggested that moral self-licensing might allow people to more easily detach 
or “disengage” (pg. 527) from these issues. Though Sachdeva et al. (2009) do not 
specifically state as such, it may be assumed that individual’s undertaking moral 
cleansing would in turn become more engaged or attached to such issues. 
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This has specific implications for the manufacturing plant manager scenario, as 
well as the environmental scenarios (discussed further below). Using community 
health side effects, and the cost of preventative filtering, as the balance between 
profits and costs, as well as the implicit environmental aspects of the pollution and 
filtering, the manufacturing plant scenarios fits neatly into two common areas of 
political concern, and activism in more committed cases. Though this experiment did 
not yield relevant data to test for a possible interaction between the effect of the 
moral prime and the potential role played by morality in commitment to a cause, it is 
important to note for further consideration and control. 
No Moral Effect for the Environment 
The failure to find any effect of the moral self-licensing prime on decisions in 
the various environmental scenarios seemingly contradicted the role of morals and 
moral concern in commitment to issues and causes, as discussed by Sachdeva et al. 
(2009), Stern et al. (1999), and Cable et al. (1988). As environmentalism and the 
environment is an area of major concern, especially amongst younger people who 
make up the majority of this experiment’s participants, it was expected that the 
manipulation of an individual’s moral state would have a significant effect on their 
responses to questions on such a hot button set of issues. However there are a 
number of theoretical explanations for this lack of effect. 
One potential reason for the failure to find an effect is that, though 
environmentalism and environmental issues are hot button and politically charged 
topics (Maher and Franklin, 2012; Essential Report, 2013), the specific scenarios 
utilised did not engage successfully with the participants. Specifically participants 
were unable to fully identify with the scenario as it was presented to them, and were 
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unable to place themselves in the hypothetical role as required. For example, in the 
questions regarding climate change and action to address it, the largely student based 
participant population would have a more difficult time identifying with the issue of 
income tax increases to fund action, given students, especially those in first year 
studies at the Australian National University, have substantially less exposure to the 
issue of income tax, and arguably feel the effect or increases less than the broader 
working public. 
Similarly in the case of both nuclear power and recycled water, though both 
issues have at times been hotly debated in Australia, they have largely been issues 
for areas other than Canberra and the Australian Capital Territory. It is therefore 
arguable that participants were unable to place themselves fully into the required 
hypothetical situation, and make decisions with which they could meaningfully 
identify. If this occurred, then the decisions made would not be expected to display 
the same effects of the moral prime as hypothesised. 
Another issue to consider is the convergence of views amongst the participants 
on the issues raised by the various environmental questions and scenarios. For 
example, in the climate change scenario, control questions regarding belief in climate 
change and need to take action were included. While opinion polling has at times 
found just over half the Australian population, and slightly more under 35s and 
university education, believe in climate change (Essential Research 2014), only 6 
participants in Experiment 2 indicated they did not believe in climate change, with 
94.5% indicating they believed, and 90.9% supporting action to address it. 
Such overwhelming belief in climate change and support for action amongst 
the participant group possibly mitigated the effects of the moral prime. Amongst a 
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group already predicated to take action, it could be argued that the moral deficit 
prime was unlikely to push to even greater action, at least to a degree that would be 
statistically significant with the included participant sample. Similarly, those primed 
with the moral credit tool were being manipulated to act against their beliefs. Hence 
it may be theorised that belief in climate change either negated the effect of the 
prime, or at least acted as a confounding factor, such that any effect of the prime was 
not significant. 
However, this leaves open the possibility that with an increased participant 
pool, and hence increased statistical power, an effect may be found. Further, due to 
the overwhelming uniformity of responses to the two control questions, it was not 
possible to undertake meaningful analysis with the controls in place. This theoretical 
explanation has interesting parallels to the discussion below regarding moral 
licensing and cleansing in interpersonal scenarios. 
Limitations of Childhood Hero and other Interpersonal Quandaries 
The lack of a significant effect of the moral self-licensing prime in the 
childhood hero interpersonal scenario raises a number of questions. These concern 
both the scenario itself, and Moll et al.’s (2003) proposed link between moral 
reasoning, itself stemming from brain-behaviour interaction and human experiences 
such as interpersonal relationships. 
The first consideration regarding the scenario is the use of meeting a childhood 
hero or taking a trip with your loved one as the two available choices. Does a 
childhood hero actually carry any significance in later life, even hypothetically, when 
compared to the wishes of a loved one and the daily requirements of maintaining a 
successful and happy relationship? As LaBarge (2005) notes, though childhood 
	 	 MORAL	LICENSING	AND	CLEANSING	 102	
heroes, and heroism itself, are difficult to detach from concepts of morality, the very 
heroes children chose for themselves ensure they become decreasingly important in 
later life. Instead of significant figures such as Martin Luther King Jr. or Abraham 
Lincoln, American children and teenagers turn to either fictional or disposable 
heroes; celebrities, rap stars and other icons who hold little value as they grow up 
and enter adulthood. Though LaBarge (2005) draws on American experiences, this 
can likely be assumed in Australia. Additionally, as Elsley (2009) demonstrated in 
research utilising depictions in children’s literature, though young people are active 
co-constructors of childhood, they understand it to be a “state of being”, a phase. 
In contrast, loving interpersonal relationships are well-established necessities 
of adulthood. Maslow, in his famous 1943 paper A Theory of Human Motivation 
outlined his hierarchy of needs, which placed “[t]he love needs” (pg. 380) as the 
third most important requirements for people, after physiological requirements such 
as food and water, and safety needs such as housing and employment. Hence, the 
presented hypothetical choice between childhood hero and time away with your 
loved one cannot be considered an evenly weighted question. Further evidence 
supporting this conclusion is found in participant responses to the included scenario 
control questions. When asked to indicate how important they felt compromise and 
communication where to relationships, all participants indicated between somewhat 
important and extremely important. Given other results, this may be interpreted as an 
indication of the importance placed on relationships. 
Moll et al.’s (2003) proposed link between moral reasoning and human 
experiences, in this case interpersonal, also bears further discussion. As indicated 
earlier, these results do not conflict with this proposed link. Rather than manipulating 
emotions, the theorised partial basis of moral judgments (Prinz, 2006), Experiment 2 
	 	 MORAL	LICENSING	AND	CLEANSING	 103	
attempted to manipulate moral condition and test for a subsequent effect on emotion 
and emotional judgments, specifically guilt and resentment. The lack of significant 
effect, a failure to identify any effect upon emotion by manipulated moral condition 
and judgment, is noteworthy. 
Though suggesting, based upon these results, that moral condition cannot alter 
emotion or emotional judgments would border on the absurd, it does again highlight 
the difficulties of hypothetical interpersonal relationship scenarios. Such scenarios, 
whether real-life or hypothetical, have numerous confounding variables that are 
difficult to control for. However, while the proposed link of Moll et al.’s (2003) is an 
interesting theoretical area, it is not the primary focus of this thesis. 
Finally, the more central consideration of whether the childhood hero scenario, 
as designed and worded, even measured for moral self-licensing should be 
acknowledged. While theoretical arguments, such as those above, can be made that 
moral self-licensing may impact interpersonal decisions, the design of the 
hypothetical in Scenario 2 actually implied that a moral prime might somehow 
change individual interpretation of emotions in interpersonal scenarios. This is not a 
clear-cut measure for moral licensing and cleansing behaviour as the other scenarios. 
As discussed further below, while moral self-licensing theory in interpersonal 
decisions remains an interesting area for further study, this design flaw should be 
noted. 
Overall Discussion 
Across two experiments, this thesis found mixed support for the effects of a 
moral self-licensing prime upon individual participants’ subsequent decision-making. 
Experiment 1 failed to find any effect for the moral prime. Experiment 2 
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demonstrated a significant effect of the prime upon individuals’ choices in certain 
circumstances. This thesis partly supports the general contention of Sachdeva et al. 
(2009) that such priming leads to a feeling of either moral entitlement or moral 
degradation, and therefore enables subsequent choices and decisions to behave in a 
less moral (immoral) or more moral (moral cleansing) fashion. 
However, the results across multiple studies raised a number of questions. 
These concerned the applicability of the theory across circumstances and scenarios, 
the mixed findings when moral licensing and cleansing prime results were analysed 
separately, and regarding the consistency of individual moral identity. 
Unlike previous research, such as Sachdeva et al. (2009), Effron et al., (2009), 
Monin and Miller (2001), Khan and Dhar (2006) and Strahilevitz and Myers (1998), 
but somewhat in line with Hayley and Zinkiewicz (2013), this thesis examined moral 
behaviour across a range of both financial/economic and non-economic scenarios. In 
Experiment 1, an interaction between moral priming and gratitude was also tested, 
while Experiment 2 examined an interaction between moral state and the source of 
criticism of participant’s initial decisions. Though surprisingly no significant 
interaction was found between the moral prime and gratitude manipulation methods, 
a statistically significant interaction effect between the moral prime and the criticism 
manipulation methods was found in Experiment 2. Further simple effects analysis 
revealed that, though there was a significant interaction effect between the moral 
prime and the community criticism condition, no significant effect was found for the 
moral prime in the company criticism condition. Across both experiments, an 
interaction between risk-taking and moral prime was examined, but no statistically 
significant effect was found. 
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Both Experiments 1 and 2 sought to partially replicate an earlier hypothetical 
scenario used by Sachdeva et al. (2009), utilising a manufacturing plant manager 
scenario. However, a number of markedly different results emerged in these 
replications. A major discrepancy between the original experiments and the 
replication performed here was the lack of consistent results comparing moral 
licensing behaviour primes (moral credit), and moral cleansing behaviour primes 
(moral deficit). While previous research has found similar effects for both moral 
states, and the relevant primes to affect such a moral state, Experiment 2 identified a 
strong effect in the moral deficit condition, though still smaller than that found in 
Sachdeva et al. (2009), with significant moral cleansing behaviour, but no significant 
effect in the moral credit condition. 
With the data available from both experiments, there is no immediately 
apparent reason for this discrepancy, both in terms of consistency in intra-experiment 
results, and between previous studies and these. It may be that certain specific or 
special conditions are required for moral licensing and cleansing behaviour to occur, 
such as regarding the situation or circumstance faced and how it may relate to the 
individual. Alternatively, the required mindset and sub-conscious decision-making 
process of the individual may be more complex and less easily predicted than 
previously thought. These possibilities, amongst others aimed at determining the 
cause of such discrepancies, are discussed below as directions for future research. 
Future Research Directions 
One direction that should be explored further is the tendency of participants 
completing the moral prime task to describe common, even everyday, good deeds in 
the moral credit condition, but less common and comparatively more explicitly 
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negative actions in the moral deficit condition. Further research utilising redesigned 
priming tasks should ensure equality between the self-descriptions in the two moral 
prime conditions. 
However, this thesis acknowledges that controlling for such differences in self-
descriptions is difficult, given the need to avoid over prescribing to participants what 
to write in the priming task, which could reduce its effectiveness. One option may be 
to ask participants to describe a recent, everyday good or negative deed or 
undertaking, which the participant undertakes regularly. Alternatively the prime 
could specify the opposite, and instruct participants to describe an out of the 
ordinary, unusual good or negative deed that they had recently undertaken. 
Future work could also examine what differences in effect may result from 
decisions resulting in an action v a lack of action, as highlighted earlier in this thesis. 
As previously found by Gilovich and Medvec (1995) in their research examining 
patterns in the experience of regret, though actions, which they labeled errors of 
commission, resulted in greater regret in the short term, inaction, which they labeled 
errors of omission, resulted in significantly greater regret over the long term. A 
similar different over longer periods was found by Rajagopal, Raju and Unnava 
(2002), though their results demonstrated no difference in the short term. Further, 
Gilovich, Medvec and Kahneman (1998) found that different emotional responses 
were evoked by action against inaction. 
In this thesis, across both experiments, moral cleansing behaviour in the 
manufacturing plan scenario constitutes an action: actively increasing filtering. 
Conversely the moral licensing behaviour of not increasing filtering levels is instead 
an inaction or lack of action. Further research could construct similar scenarios, but 
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altered so that both moral licensing and cleansing behaviour required actions, as well 
as scenarios where both moral licensing and cleansing behaviours required a lack of 
action. Both options would provide additional data regarding the difference in 
approach to action against inaction, and how this may effect individual perceptions 
of their choices in moral situations. 
In earlier discussion of the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, as well as 
comparisons between those of this thesis and previous research by Sachdeva et al. 
(2009), it was hypothesised that one confounding factor may have been the 
familiarity, or accessibility of the hypothetical scenario to participants. In cases 
where the hypothesised scenario was unfamiliar, or inaccessible, to one group of 
participants in contrast to another, this may influence their consideration of the 
decision, and confound the expected effect of the moral prime manipulation. This 
provides a rich area for future research, utilising scenarios of similar design and 
characteristics, though differing in accessibility and relation to everyday experiences. 
Such research should be carried out using participant pools of consistent 
characteristics, such as nationality, background, education etc. Conversely, the effect 
of accessibility could be examined through the use to two or more separate 
participant pools, with scenarios specifically designed to relate to the everyday 
experiences of one participant pool, but not the other. 
A related area for further study is limiting the accessibility of a scenario 
through the use of the hypothetical other. Though this thesis found a statistically 
significant effect of moral priming when participants were questioned over their own 
hypothetical actions and decisions, results were more mixed regarding the actions of 
hypothetical others. Whether such findings are the result of a form of the Wilder or 
Bradley Effect, where an individual indicates they will take a certain action because 
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it is viewed as the more acceptable course of action, but in reality intend to undertake 
a different, less socially acceptable action (Hopkins, 2009; Stout & Kline, 2008) may 
be explored in future research. 
Originating in political science, the use of a hypothetical other was designed to 
elicit an individual’s true response rather than the perceived more acceptable or 
correct one, and therefore circumvent the Wilder Effect. It has also been used to 
avoid self-enhancement or social desirability in responses by asking individuals 
about the actions of a close friend against an average person. In such cases, the close 
friend response is taken as the individual’s view of someone like themselves. 
Applied to moral licensing and cleansing theory, the hypothetical other could allow 
for further exploration of any interaction between social desirability, self-
enhancement, or even the preferred course of action, against that at least partially 
dictated by the moral prime. Such further exploration would also allow for an 
increased understanding of the applicability of this theory across differing 
circumstances. 
This thesis also raised a number of questions regarding the applicability of 
moral licensing and cleansing theory beyond economic decision-making scenarios. 
Further research should be undertaken to test what effects moral priming has in 
scenarios unrelated to economic decisions. Similarly, where previous research has 
used charity and the consumption of luxury items as the two contrasting moral 
behaviours (cleansing v. licensing), and Experiments 1 and 2 in this thesis had a 
similar distinction in the plant manager scenario (profits v. community health), future 
work could examining the effects of moral priming in scenarios where the distinction 
between decisions is less clear. 
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For example, how would participants in the two moral prime conditions react 
when faced with two negative or positive courses of actions, where one perhaps 
represents the lesser of two evils? Would individuals primed using the moral deficit 
prime, and expected to undertake moral cleansing behaviour, choose the lesser of 
two evils to a significant extent, and would the reverse be illustrated for moral credit 
condition primed individuals? Such future research would be of a similar vein to the 
proposed study of possible differences between actions and inactions; both would 
further draw out moral self-licensing theory and its applicability in situations without 
sharp moral contrasts between various courses of action.  
In Experiment 2, this thesis attempted to examine the effects of moral priming 
in an interpersonal scenario, distinct from the economic scenarios widely utilised. 
However this thesis found no significant effect for this scenario, centered on 
conflicting commitments between the participant and a loved one, with no increase 
in moral cleansing or moral licensing behaviour due to the prime. However, this 
remains an area for future study. Considerations for any such research should include 
whether the moral licensing and cleansing theory can be applied in circumstances of 
emotive decision-making, or whether it is limited to scenarios where any decisions 
are mostly rational, such as financial and consumption related ones? 
Further exploration of moral licensing and cleansing in interpersonal situations 
may also explore the proposed link between brain-behaviour interaction and our 
moral reasoning (Moll et al., 2003). Such research could also examine the 
subsequent link between our moral reasoning and common human experiences, 
including relationships, and the various additional factors that complicate isolating 
and manipulating the moral licensing or cleansing effect. 
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Interpersonal relationships inevitably carry what can be described as baggage, 
in layman’s terms, which itself may be hypothesised to play a large role in decision-
making and behaviour. One direction for future research may be to explore moral 
self-licensing, and how moral priming can influence decision-making in newer, less 
established relationships against long-term relationships. Research could also 
examine the difference in moral self-licensing behaviour in situations regarding a 
romantic partner against other interpersonal relationships such as family or close 
friends. In both cases it would also be advisable to include a detailed questionnaire 
designed to provide the requisite data to control for various confounding factors – the 
baggage previously referred to. This research would provide valuable insight into 
how moral self-licensing may explain behaviour in more complex, common 
scenarios and how various other factors may, in some cases, play a more important 
part in decisions reached.  
Perhaps the largest contrast between the results of this thesis, and those of 
previous studies, and indeed between this thesis and the theory of moral licensing 
and cleansing, is in the consistency of moral identity. As outlined by Hayley and 
Zinkiewicz (2013), the very act of moral cleansing is an attempt to protect a 
threatened moral identity. Yet across multiple scenarios, participants acted 
erratically, seemingly conforming to a moral identity in one scenario, and willfully 
discarding it in the next. This was despite the use of moral primes intended to 
uniformly manipulate each participant’s moral identity. 
One methodological avenue to address this would be to include tests or 
questionnaires tp ascertain the participant’s salient moral identity at key points 
throughout the experiment. Though this would not immediately identify the reason 
for this inconsistency, it would provide greater data and evidence pinpointing when 
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the moral identity changes, and hence allow for an identification of possible causes. 
It would also allow future research to not be concerned with potential abrupt 
inconsistencies, which impacts the main focus and theoretical hypotheses. 
Additionally, using such a method would potentially provide greater insight into the 
strength of various moral primes, and how long they may affect an individual’s 
moral identity. Such findings would add substantially to our understanding of the 
theory of moral self-licensing, and how it may or may not explain various 
behaviours, decisions, and patterns in actions. 
Concluding Remarks 
Though the results discussed in this thesis did not fully support the claim that 
moral licensing and cleansing are “pervasive and everyday phenomena” Sachdeva et 
al. (2009, pg. 527), they demonstrated that under certain conditions moral licensing 
and cleansing theory can explain certain individual behaviours and decision. The 
theory also presents a plausible guide to individuals’ often contrasting behaviour 
across various circumstances. While history is replete with illustrations of both moral 
licensing and moral cleansing behaviour, it has often been ignored. Similarly, while 
religion is replete with examples of moral cleansing, it seemingly ignores licensing 
behaviour (this is perhaps an outcome of the redemptive message of many religions). 
Both the experiments carried out in this thesis, and the previous research discussed, 
go some way to applying psychological understanding to what is essentially an 
ancient proposition. 
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Appendix A 
Initial Briefing (Provided Verbally) 
 
Thank you for your participation today. My name is David Reeves and I am the 
Research Assistant to Professor Michael Smithson, whose study you are taking part 
in today. This experiment seeks to explore links between individual morality and 
decision-making across a number of hypothetical scenarios. 
The experiment comprises of three sections, with two completed on paper and one of 
the computer. Individual instructions for each section are provided, but if you have 
any questions please do not hesitate to ask. 
Also, you are free to withdraw from this research at any time, either during or after. 
 
Decision Making and Moral Choice (Moral Self-Licensing Prime) 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research. 
 
This study aims to explore decision-making and moral choice. 
 
First however, please take moment to think about how you would describe yourself if 
you were writing a journal, or similar personal description. 
 
In the space provided below, please write a short (100-200 words) passage 
describing yourself. However, please focus on your positive traits, using only 
positive nouns and descriptive phrases. 
 
Or 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research. 
 
This study aims to explore decision-making and moral choice. 
 
First however, please take moment to think about how you would describe yourself if 
you were writing a journal, or similar personal description. 
 
In the space provided below, please write a short (100-200 words) passage 
describing yourself. However, please focus on your negative traits, using only 
negative nouns and descriptive phrases. 
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Task 2 
 
Please do not open this booklet until you have read the following instructions. 
 
In the following section, you will be asked to read through a hypothetical scenario, 
imagining you were the individual involved. You will then be asked a series of 
question concerning the passage, and what choices you would make in such a 
circumstance. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers. I am genuinely interested in your views on 
these scenarios; it is impossible to give the wrong answer. As such, please answer 
truthfully, and ensure the answer you give is truly your own opinion, and not that of 
a friend, or another individual. 
 
Following these scenarios and questions, you will then be asked to complete a Risk-
Attitude Scale and answer a number of control and demographic questions. 
 
Thank you for your participation in this research. 
 
You may now open this booklet and continue with the study 
 
Scenario 1 
 
You are the manager of one large manufacturing plant, located in the outer suburbs 
of a major Australian city. This plant is a series of plants, each operated by the same 
company, but each having an individual manager such as yourself.  As manager of 
the plant, you are held responsible for maximising the plants profits, while at the 
same time maintaining a good reputation for the plant amongst the community. 
 
Due to the manufacturing process, your plant, like operated by this company, emits 
toxic, carcinogenic chemicals into the atmosphere. As a result of recent lobbying and 
pressure from environmental groups, the company has agreed to a plan whereby 
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these toxic chemicals will be filtered 60% of the time. 
 
This filtering plan will cost $1.2 million a year, per plant. This represents a cost of 
$0.2 million per 10% of toxins filtered. For example, if you were to use the filter 40% 
of the time, it would cost $0.8 million. 
However, for the previous 2 years, your plant has been recording a loss. As such the 
company CEO has warned you that you face demotion if you are unable to record a 
profit for the coming year. 
 
Questions 
1. As the manager of this plant, what percentage of time would you use the 
filters?  
2. What percentage of time would you expect the manager of one of the other 
plants to use the filters?  
3. Using the scale below, please indicate what you think- is the likelihood of 
being caught if you filter less than the agreed level of 60% or more?  
1    5     10 
 
 
Highly    Not     Highly 
Unlikely    sure     Likely 
 
 
4. Using the scale below, please indicate to what extent do you believe the plant 
manager has a greater responsibility: profits or the environment? 
1    5     10 
 
Profits    Equal    Environment 
  
Scenario 2 
 
You have recently completed high school and have moved interstate to attend your 
preferred university. This is the first time you have ever lived away from home. 
 
As a condition of you moving, your mother makes a deal whereby you will call home 
every Thursday evening at 9pm. This phone call allows you and your parents to keep 
in touch, as well as lets them know you are safe and doing well. 
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You have now been living interstate for just over a month, and have duly called 
home every Thursday evening at 9pm. However, this week your friend has managed 
to score tickets to the sold-out farewell concert of your favourite band. This will be 
your last ever opportunity to see this group. Unfortunately, the concert is on 
Thursday evening, beginning at 8pm. 
 
Knowing that your parents disapprove of going out when you have classes the next 
day, and how important the weekly phone call is to them, you are left to make an 
uncomfortable choice. 
 
Questions 
1. In this situation, do you:  
A) Lie to your parents that you couldn’t call because you were sick, and 
therefore attend the concert. 
B) Tell your friend that you are unable to attend the concert, and stay home to 
call your parents. 
Option A or B? 
2. If placed in a similar situation, which choice do you think your best friend 
would make? Option A or B? 
3. Using the scale below, indicate what you think is the likelihood of you being 
caught if you lie to your parents and attend the concert? 
 
1       5     10 
 
 
Highly    Neither    Highly 
Unlikely        Likely 
  
4. Using the scale below, please indicate how serious you believe telling such a 
lie is? 
 
1          5          10 
 
 
Not at all   Neither    Extremely 
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Scenario 3 
 
You are in the 3rd and final year of your Bachelors degree at ANU. While your 
overall grade average is good, you have been really struggling in one of your courses, 
and are on the borderline of either passing or failing. 
 
If you fail this class, it will mean you are unable to graduate at the end of the year 
and will have to return the following year for another semester. Additionally, you 
will no longer be able to take up your dream job offer, as your prospective employer 
requires that you hold a university degree. 
 
By luck, an acquaintance of yours is the Teacher’s Assistant for the course you are 
struggling in. Knowing what is at stake for you, your friend offers you an answer 
guide to part of the forthcoming exam, which would enable you to pass the course 
and go onto graduate. However, if you were caught, you would be severely punished 
by the university, as would your friend, with both of you probably being expelled 
from the ANU. 
 
1. In this situation, do you: 
A) Accept your friends offer, therefore cheating on the exam and passing the 
course and graduating, although risk being caught. 
B) Thank your friend but reject his offer, and attempt to complete the course 
honestly? 
Option A or B? 
2. Placed in a similar situation, which option do you think your best friend 
would take? 
Option A or B? 
3. Using the scale below, please indicate what you think is the likelihood of you 
being caught cheating? 
 
1          5           10 
 
 
 Highly    Neither    Highly 
 Unlikely        Likely 
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4. Using the scale below, please indicate how serious do you believe this act of 
cheating is? 
 
1              5         10 
 
 
Not at        Neither    Extremely 
All 
 
 
Scale of Risk-Attitude 
 
 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood of you 
engaging in each activity. The scale is presented below. 
 
      1    2     3    4     5 
     Extremely  Not   Extremely 
Unlikely  Sure     Likely 
 
 
1. Buying an illegal drug for your own use.  1 2 3 4 5 
2. Cheating a fair amount on your income tax. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Cheating on an exam.    1 2 3 4 5 
4. Driving home after you had 3 drinks in the 
last 2 hours.      1 2 3 4 5 
5. Forging somebody’s signature.   1 2 3 4 5 
6. Illegally copying a piece of software.   1 2 3 4 5 
7. Plagiarising a major assignment.    1 2 3 4 5 
8. Shoplifting a small item (i.e. a lipstick or a pen).  1 2 3 4 5 
9. Stealing your neighbour’s WiFi internet 
connection.      1 2 3 4 5 
10. Using office supplies for your personal 
business.      1 2 3 4 5 
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For each of the following statements, please indicate the risk level you perceive 
from engaging in each activity. The scale is presented below. 
 
      1  2   3   4    5 
          Not At All             Moderately Extremely 
      Risky  Risky           Risky 
 
 
1. Buying an illegal drug for your own use.  1 2 3 4 5 
2. Cheating a fair amount on your income tax. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Cheating on an exam.    1 2 3 4 5 
4. Driving home after you had 3 drinks in the 
last 2 hours.      1 2 3 4 5 
5. Forging somebody’s signature.   1 2 3 4 5 
6. Illegally copying a piece of software.   1 2 3 4 5 
7. Plagiarising a major assignment.    1 2 3 4 5 
8. Shoplifting a small item (i.e. a lipstick or a pen).  1 2 3 4 5 
9. Stealing your neighbour’s WiFi internet 
connection.      1 2 3 4 5 
10. Using office supplies for your personal 
business.      1 2 3 4 5 
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Finally, for each of the following statements, please indicate the benefit you 
perceive as resulting from engaging in each activity. The scale is presented below. 
 
      1     2      3       4         5 
     No Benefit          Moderate              Great 
     At All             Benefit            Benefit 
 
 
1. Buying an illegal drug for your own use.  1 2 3 4 5 
2. Cheating a fair amount on your income tax. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Cheating on an exam.    1 2 3 4 5 
4. Driving home after you had 3 drinks in the 
last 2 hours.      1 2 3 4 5 
5. Forging somebody’s signature.   1 2 3 4 5 
6. Illegally copying a piece of software.   1 2 3 4 5 
7. Plagiarising a major assignment.    1 2 3 4 5 
8. Shoplifting a small item (i.e. a lipstick or a pen).  1 2 3 4 5 
9. Stealing your neighbour’s WiFi internet 
connection.      1 2 3 4 5 
10. Using office supplies for your personal 
business.      1 2 3 4 5 
 
Demographic Questions 
 
Age:  
 
Gender: M F 
 
Occupation: 
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! Using the scale below, please indicate to what extent you consider yourself 
an environmentalist. 
 
1    2       3           4 5 
 
 
 
         Apathetic Somewhat  Highly 
   Committed  Committed 
 
 
! On a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being always tells the truth, 5 being tell the truth 
half the time, and 10 being always lies, rate how often you believe you tell 
the truth. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
 
Always          Half the      Always 
Truth             Time            Lies 
 
 
! Using the above scale, please indicate using a numerical value, how often you 
believe a friend, similar to you, tells the truth. 
! Are you religious? Please tick. Yes   No 
! Do you generally support a specific political party? Please tick. Yes 
 No  
! On a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being never academically honest, 5 being 
academically honest half the time, and 10 being always academically 
honest, rate how academically honest you see yourself as. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
 
 
Never      Honest Half           Always                                             
Honest      the Time               Honest 
 
! Using the above scale, please indicate using a numerical value, how 
academically honest a friend, similar to you, is. 
 
Thank you for you participation in this research. 
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Information Sheet 
 
Thankyou for your participation in this research. Your contribution is highly valued. 
 
This study aimed to examine the relationship existing between emotions, morality 
and the occurrence of temporal discounting. Specifically, what effects gratitude has 
upon the delay of gratification behaviour, as well as how this effect may be mediated 
or impacted upon by an individuals "moral licensing." 
 
The term moral licensing refers the taking of decisions/making of actions that are 
immoral by in individual who believes they are highly moral. It has been theorised 
that if an individual believes themselves to be greatly moral, have an over abundance 
of ‘moral credit,’ then he is she is moral likely to allow themselves to act in an 
immoral manner. Conversely, an individual who believes they have a deficit of 
‘moral credit’ is more likely to act in highly moral way, to make decisions he or she 
sees as moral, in order to restore their moral standing. 
 
To explore and examine these relationships, a slight deception was required. Firstly, 
the individual who conducted this experiment was in fact the researcher himself, not 
an individual employed to simply guide participants, as claimed. 
 
Secondly, two conditions existed during Part 2 of the study, performed on a 
computer. In one condition, the computer appeared to freeze and the investigator 
appeared to ‘fix’ the problem, with the aim of gaining the participants gratitude. This 
computer problem was planned as was the investigators actions, in order to maximise 
the chance of gratitude, and test whether the presence of gratitude would impact a 
participant’s likelihood of agreeing to perform a final task, unrelated to the main 
study. 
 
We do not foresee any psychological risks from participation in this research, as 
procedures and questions are based upon those used in previous research. 
 
All data collected in this experiment will remain confidential as far as the law allows. 
Your responses are also anonymous. This data will be used in both a student Masters 
of Philosophy (Psychology) study, and research by both Professor Smithson and 
Associate Professor Platow, and may be published in academic journals, or presented 
at conferences. However, such reporting would be of data trends, and individual 
responses will not be identifiable from such reporting. 
 
Participation in this study is voluntary, and you are free to withdraw at any time, 
without penalty. Any payment or course credit you receive will not for forfeited. 
 
If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact David Reeves on 
u4314694@anu.edu.au, or Professor Michael Smithson or Dr. Michael Platow at the 
ANU School of Psychology on 02 6125 2795. 
 
If you hold concerns about how this study was conducted, please contact: 
 
Secretary (Human Ethics Officer) 
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Human Research Ethics Committee 
Research Office 
The Australian National University 
ACT 0200 
Phone: 02 6125 3427 
Email: Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au 
 
If you would like to learn about the outcomes of this study, please feel free to contact 
me at u4314694@anu.edu.au and I will be happy to provide you with the results of 
this research. 
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Appendix B 
Moral Self-Licensing 
Informed Consent 
This form is to illustrate that you, the participant, give permission for any data and/or 
answers you provide during this testing, to be used in the experimenters Masters of 
Philosophy (Psychology) study. 
 
All data collected herein is for the use of the afore mentioned Masters Study, and 
will only be viewed by the experimenters, and any contracted research assistants. 
 
Your responses are anonymous and collected data is treated confidentially as far as 
the law allows.  No individual responses will be presented in the thesis or any 
published work.  
 
Participation in this study is voluntary, and you may withdraw from this study at any 
time while answering the questionnaire. 
 
Furthermore, you have a right to view any results obtained. Details on obtaining a 
copy of said results is provided on your feedback sheet, which you will be provided 
with at the end of your participation in this study. 
 
Scenario 1 
You have recently been promoted into a managerial position within a major 
Australian manufacturing firm. Your company owns and operates a number of 
manufacturing plants throughout Australia, mostly located in the outer-industrial 
areas of major cities. 
 
Your position within management has a dual focus on business, and community 
engagement. 
 
In line with this focus, you have recently taken the lead in negotiations with a 
number of community advocacy groups, as well as nationwide environmental groups 
relating to chemicals released by your company’s plants. 
 
During the manufacturing of certain goods, a number of harmful chemicals are 
released into both the atmosphere and soil. These chemicals are known to have a 
number of health-related side effects, with research indicating that for every 10% of 
unfiltered release, 1000 people in the local community will suffer headaches, 
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breathing problems and other effects. As such, both environmental and community 
groups have begun lobbying and negotiations with you, in the hope of securing a 
deal to restrict the release of such chemicals by filtering them for an agreed-upon 
percentage of the time taken by the manufacturing process. 
 
The filtering process incurs costs. The company accountants have calculated that 
filtering for 10% of the manufacturing process time, the cost equates to 3% of your 
company’s profits. However, the accountants also have calculated that every 10% of 
time not filtered could cost 2% of profits in lost revenue due to negative public 
perception. Because of this, your manager has offered you a $250 salary increase for 
every 1% of profit loss that you prevent. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. In the negotiations, taking into account both cost and public image, what 
percentage of time for filtering would you aim at getting agreement on? Please use 
the slider below to indicate your response. 
2. Taking account of both cost and public image, what percentage of time for 
filtering would you expect a manager at a rival company aim at getting agreement 
on? Please use the slider below to indicate your response. 
3. In the negotiations, taking into account both cost and public image, what 
percentage of time would you expect another manager at your company aim at 
getting agreement on? Please use the slider below to indicate your response. 
 
Moral Prime 
Please take a minute to think about a recent occasion were you have performed an 
unselfish act or a good deed. This occasion should have been purely to the benefit of 
someone else. 
 
In the space below, please write a couple of paragraphs describing this act/deed, and 
its effects. 
Or 
Please take a minute to think about a recent occasion were you have been selfish or 
performed a bad deed. This occasion should have had a harmful effect on another 
person or benefited you at their expense. 
 
In the space below, please write a couple of paragraphs describing this act/deed, and 
its effects. 
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Gratitude Prime 
It has now been a year since the filtering process you negotiated and agreed to has 
been in place. 
During this time, the agreement you negotiated has come under strong criticism from 
within the company due to the percentage of profits lost in filtering costs. 
Or 
During this time, the agreement you negotiated has come under strong criticism from 
the community due to a perceived failure to adequately protect them from the 
harmful chemical releases, and the side effects of this. 
 
Scenario 1 Again 
 
Because of this, after one year, the original parties have once again come together to 
negotiate any changes to the original agreement. 
 
You are once again the individual placed in charge of the negotiations. 
 
1. In this second set of meetings, would you seek to renegotiate the agreement on 
filtering percentage? 
2. If yes to the above question, what percentage of filter time would you seek to 
reach agreement at? Please give you answer on a scale of 0-100%. 
3. In this second set of meetings, would you expect a manager at a rival company 
to seek to renegotiate the agreement on filtering percentage? 
4. If yes to the above question, what percentage of filter time would you expect a 
manager at a rival company seek to reach agreement at? Please give you answer on 
a scale of 0-100%. 
5. In this second set of meetings, would you expect another manager at your 
company to seek to renegotiate the agreement on filtering percentage? 
6. If yes to the above question, what percentage of filter time would you expect 
another manager at your company seek to reach agreement at? Please give you 
answer on a scale of 0-100%. 
 
Scenario 2 
The Australian Federal Government has recently announced the details of its Carbon 
Pricing scheme, in order to reduce Australia’s carbon emissions. Under this plan 
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consumers will not be taxed, instead 500 of Australia largest polluting companies 
will pay for their emissions. 
 
However, suppose hypothetically that the carbon tax was to also be imposed upon 
individuals. 
 
1. Using a range of 1-10% of your personal, pre-tax income, please indicate how 
much you would be willing to pay to do your part under such a hypothetical tax. 
Please note this amount would be in addition to standard income tax. 
 
2. Do you believe that there has been human induced climate change? Y/N 
 
3. Do you believe that action needs to be taken in order to either counter, or mitigate 
climate change? Y/N 
 
Scenario 3 
The availability of water has become a major concern for Australian governments 
due to the effects of recent droughts, combined with an ever-growing population. 
Because of this, a number of options to increase water supplies have been discussed. 
 
Due to favourable size and geography, the ACT Government has decided to 
undertake a pilot study into using recycled water as part of the mains water supply. 
The suburbs to undertake this trial include the inner-north and ANU. 
 
1. Using the scale below, indicate your willingness to drink recycled water as part of 
the trial. 
7 point Likert scale 1 = extremely unwilling, 4 = neutral, 7 = extremely willing 
 
Scenario 4 
Australia’s population is currently growing at a rapid rate. Some predictions indicate 
that it will exceed 40 million in a few decades. 
 
One of the major issues such population growth raises, is continuing to provide 
affordable base-load power. This is further complicated by environmental concerns, 
with coal-fired power stations being amongst the highest emitting sources of power. 
 
One possible option is nuclear power. Unlike coal it is a clean source of energy, yet 
is also a proven technology, capable of providing base-load power. 
 
These positives however must be weighed against the inherent dangers in nuclear 
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power, illustrated by such disasters as Chernobyl and the recent Fukushima partial 
meltdown. 
 
Imagine that the ACT had been chosen as a trial ground for nuclear power in 
Australia, and as such there was to be built a base-load capable nuclear plant in the 
outer regions of Canberra. 
 
1. Using the scale below, please indicate your willingness to accept nuclear power in 
the ACT as a clean energy source, despite its dangers. 
7 point Likert scale 1 = extremely unwilling, 4 = neutral, 7 = extremely willing 
 
Scenario 5 
Please take a minute to consider you’re your current boyfriend/husband or 
girlfriend/wife. If you are single, please consider your closest, dearest friend. 
 
You are confronted with a situation where you have the opportunity to meet a major 
childhood hero. This would be a once in a lifetime chance for you. 
 
However, this meeting clashes with a trip your partner has been planning for both of 
you for many months. Due to work commitments, this would be your last chance for 
a weekend away together for at least the next year. 
 
1. Using the scale below, indicate how resentful you would be if you went on the trip. 
7 point Likert scale 1 = extremely resentful, 4 = neutral, 7 = extremely non-resentful 
2. Using the scale below, indicate how guilty you would feel if skipped the trip, and 
instead took the chance to meet your childhood hero. 
7 point Likert scale 1 = extremely guilty, 4 = neutral, 7 = extremely non-guilty 
 
3. Using the scale below, indicate how important you believe communication is to a 
successful relationship. 
7 point Likert scale 1 = extremely unimportant, 4 = neutral, 7 = extremely important 
 
4. Using the scale below, indicate how important you believe compromise is to a 
successful relationship 
 
7 point Likert scale 1 = extremely unimportant, 4 = neutral, 7 = extremely important 
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Demographic Questions 
 
Age:  
 
Are you female? Y/N 
 
Occupation: 
 
Are you typically a supporter of one specific political party? Y/N 
 
If answered yes to above, please indicate which party. 
 
Information Sheet 
 
Thankyou for your participation in this research. Your contribution is highly valued. 
 
This study aimed to examine the relationship between decision-making, and various 
circumstantial moralities. Specifically, this study sought to further explore the link 
between theoretical moral licensing, and decision-making. 
 
The term moral self-licensing refers the taking of decisions/making of actions that 
are immoral by in individual who believes they are highly moral. It has been 
theorised that if an individual believes themselves to be greatly moral, have an over 
abundance of ‘moral credit,’ then he is she is moral likely to allow themselves to act 
in an immoral manner. Conversely, an individual who believes they have a deficit of 
‘moral credit’ is more likely to act in highly moral way, to make decisions he or she 
sees as moral, in order to restore their moral standing. 
 
In two sections of this study, you will have been assigned to one of two conditions. 
In one section, you may have been asked to recall either a good, or a bad deed, while 
following this some participants are told they have come under company criticism, 
while others are instructed they have come under community criticism. These 
options create a 2x2 design for this study, and hence allow for moral licensing to be 
manipulated. 
 
We do not foresee any psychological risks from participation in this research, as 
procedures and questions are based upon those used in previous research. 
 
All data collected in this experiment will remain confidential as far as the law allows. 
Your responses are also anonymous. This data will be used in a student Master of 
Philosophy (Psychology) study and may be published in academic journals, or 
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presented at conferences. However, such reporting would be of data trends, and 
individual responses will not be identifiable from such reporting. 
 
Participation in this study is voluntary, and you are free to withdraw at any time, 
without penalty. Any course credit you receive will not for forfeited. 
 
If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact David Reeves on 
u4314694@anu.edu.au, or Professor Michael Smithson on 
michael.smithson@anu.edu.au 
 
If you hold concerns about how this study was conducted, please contact: 
 
Secretary (Human Ethics Officer) 
Human Research Ethics Committee 
Research Office 
Lower Ground Floor  
Chancellery 10B  
East Road 
Australian National University 
Acton ACT 0200 
Phone: 02 6125 4807 
Email: Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au 
 
If you would like to learn about the outcomes of this study, please feel free to contact 
me at u4314694@anu.edu.au and I will be happy to provide you with the results of 
this research. 
